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Abstract 
This thesis traces the development of the concept of the 
common heritage of mankind from its introduction by Arvid 
Pardo, the Ambassador to the United Nations from Malta, in 
1967 to its translation into policy in the 1982 Third United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The thesis pays 
particular attention to the people and ideas that influenced 
Pardo and the historical period of the late 1960s in which the 
common heritage idea for the deep seabed was articulated. It 
was a period of international idealism and a brief period in 
which the United States President, Lyndon Johnson, lent his 
grandiose rhetoric to the idea of managing the deep oceans as a 
common heritage. However, the problem was that the idea 
could not be translated into workable public policy for 
international cooperation in mining the deep seabed. The idea 
became a vehicle for a number of groups and individuals 
including the Third World nations that wanted to make it a 
part of their demands for ·a new economic order. Although a 
seabed mining regime was negotiated and is in place in the 
treaty, the United States and some other developed nations 
refused· to sign the treaty because of the seabed regime. Other 
events that hurt the process of turning the common heritage 
idea into workable policy were the decline in demand for 
minerals and a global recession that made such an expensive 
enterprise less attractive. 
11 
This thesis is also an examination of how a small group of 
visionaries were able to promote an idea and place it on a 
global agenda. Despite the fact that seabed mining has yet to 
take place and the treaty remains unratified ten years after its 
completion, the general issues that the common heritage idea 
raised has not evaporated. International environmental 
diplomacy today depends on nations devising ways to manage 
resources in common such as the ocean, rainforests and the 
atmosphere. This diplomacy also depends on the ability of the 
more wealthy industrialized nations to cooperate with the 
poorer, less developed countries. This form of cooperation 
failed with seabed mining. But it must eventually succeed with 
more vital global resources. 
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Introduction 
International political changes and oceanographic 
advances set the stage at the end of the 1960s for a rare 
flowering of idealism. Nurtured by this period of idealism, a 
little-known ambassador from Malta, Arvid Pardo, declared 
that the deep seabed should be considered the common 
heritage of mankind in 1967 .1 The idea appealed to the world's 
developing countries and was turned into a United Nations 
resolution that the United States, other powerful developed 
countries and developing countries supported in 1970.2 The 
common heritage concept was expressed to the world again at 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). At this conference, representatives from 140 nations 
that did not include the United States agreed in 1982 that the 
deep seabed together with its resources should be considered 
the common heritage of mankind, a place to be managed by an 
international authority and to be mined for the enrichment of 
all nations, in particular the world's developing nations. But for 
a number of reasons, the concept could not be translated into 
workable international policy for the deep seabed. 
Pardo drew upon an ancient belief that the ocean 
belonged to no man, no nation, but to all people of all nations 
when he shaped the common heritage concept. This belief was 
1. United Nations, General Assembly, (Doc. A/C.l/PV. 1515, 1516), 1 November 
1967. 
2. United Nations, General Assembly, Res. 2749 (XXV), 17 December 1970. 
1 
taken for granted when the ocean was a dangerous and remote 
place. But as technology began to remove the barriers to this no 
man's land, Pardo believed the chances increased that powerful 
maritime nations would take control of increasing amounts of 
ocean space and ocean wealth. It was this concern that set the 
stage for a new definition of the ocean as the common heritage 
of mankind. In 1970, the United Nations General Assembly 
passed a resolution at the urging of Pardo that defined the 
common heritage as: "the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the 
subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as 
well as the resources of the area ... "3 
Technology, primarily improved equipment to extract oil 
from beneath the continental shelf and new instruments to 
examine the deep sea, provided the backdrop for the common 
heritage concept. However, scientists did not play as significant 
a role in developing policy for the deep seabed as political 
leaders. But the political leaders drew extensively of the 
writings of John Mero, a California engineer, who was one of 
the first to proclaim a great wealth of minerals in the seabed.4 
His ideas, which would later come under scrutiny and 
criticism,5 were picked up by nonscientific world-stage players 
and used extensively to spearhead the common heritage 
concept in the 1970s. 
3. Ibid. 
4.· John Mero, The Mineral Resources of the Sea (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1965). 
5. Markus Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden? (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989), p. 12. 
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This thesis focuses on the individuals who articulated, 
defined and promoted the principle of the common heritage of 
mankind and applied it to the world's oceans. The motivations 
of these players varied. For some, the concept was a vehicle to 
achieve the so-called New International Economic Order6 by 
devising a way to include the emerging nations as managers of 
the ocean's deep seabed. It was the first significant test of this 
movement.7 For others, the common heritage was an old idea 
that had not worked in other places, but might be successfully 
applied to a new place - the deep seabed.8 For certain 
members of the nongovernmental organization movement, the 
common heritage was a way of achieving world federalism and 
a step toward world peace.9 For others, it was a way of trying 
to distribute the wealth of the oceans in a more egalitarian 
manner. For some who were acting out roles assigned by their 
governments, it was a bargaining tool, a concept they might not 
have agreed to at any other time, but one that could be used as 
quid pro quo to get Third World nations· to agree to other 
provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea.1 o 
6. P.N. Agarwala, The New International Economic Order: An Overview (New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1983). 
7. Barbara Weaver, former activist with United Methodist Law of the Sea Project, 
personal interview with author, New York City, 20 September 1991. 
8. Elisabeth Mann Borgese, et al., eds., The Tides of Change: Peace, Pollution and 
Potential of the Oceans (New York: Mason/Charter, 1975). 
9. John Logue, ed., The Fate of the Oceans (Villanova: World Order Research 
Institute, 1972). 
10. Claiborne Pell, "Introduction," San Diego Law Review, vol. 18, no. 3 (1981): p. 
391. 
3 
The hypothesis of this study is that the doctrine of the 
common heritage of mankind was a vehicle for many other 
goals - goals that were not always grounded in political, 
economic or technological reality. The political reality during 
the period when the idea was introduced was that there were 
enormous philosophical differences between some 
industrialized nations and the majority of developing countries 
on how much political power an international organization 
should have over what would be a business enterprise, mining 
the seabed for minerals. These differences made cooperation 
between countries with divergent philosophies difficult to 
negotiate. The doctrine was also touted at a time when 
industrialized nations feared a shortage of land-based minerals 
and feared they might be held captive by OPEC-like mineral 
cartels.11 These countries were looking for a new source of 
minerals that might be extracted from nuetral territory. 
However, the metal shortage abated by the 1980s when metal 
prices dropped worldwide, making seabed mining much less 
viable and an international mining venture less urgent. The 
concept was also based on an assumption that the technology to 
mine seabed minerals would become more accessible to 
developing countries in the near future. Time proved that this 
was unrealistic because seabed mining has not been done by 
developed or developing countries. 
1 i. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Report of 
Congressional Research Service on Deep Seabed Minerals: Resources, Diplomacy, 
and Strategic Interest, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1 March 1978. 
4 
The mining regime that developed at UNCLOS from the 
common heritage concept was not equipped to weather the 
rapidly changing nature of world politics or world economics. 
The regime included production controls and allowed for 
extensive control of private industry by the international 
organization. In the last two decades, criticism of government 
intervention in the market-place has grown. The fall of 
communism in Eastern Europe in the 1990s has caused policy-
makers to question the political viability of state-controlled 
economies. This general critique has helped to discredit the 
mining regime. 
The people who first articulated the common heritage 
concept to the world, Arvid Pardo and Elisabeth Mann Borgese, 
who was to serve as an Austrian delegate to UNCLOS, 
envisioned a powerful international organization that would 
regulate oil drilling, mineral mining, scientific research, 
military use and environmental protection of an area of ocean 
space that would begin just beyond the territorial sea. The 
resulting 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea seabed provisions did not create such a broad and powerful 
entity. The treaty created a regime for mining seabed 
manganese nodules in an area beyond the newly created 
Exclusive Economic Zone.12 The United States and some other 
industrialized nations rejected the entire seabed portion of the 
12. The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond the territorial sea which 
extends 200 miles beyond the baseline of a nation. It is defined in Part V of the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, reprinted in International 
Legal Materials, vol. XXI, no. 6, (November 1982): p. 1279. 
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treaty and have yet to sign the convention. This has left 
international marine policy with an unsuccessful doctrine. 
A major goal of the thesis is to set a precedent by writing 
an intellectual history that identifies the thinkers who 
developed, articulated, shaped and promoted a significant 
doctrine of modern ocean law. The thesis also examines that 
moment in history when marine policy coalesced around the 
common heritage concept. Heightened understanding of this 
moment and the thinkers and ideas that helped create it could 
assist future leaders in marine affairs to form new ideas and 
translate them into policy. The evolution of the common 
heritage concept and its failure to create viable economic policy 
might also provide policy-makers with some warnings of 
possible pitfalls. 
Yet, this thesis does not conclude the common heritage 
was a complete failure. Although the concept has not yet 
resulted in seabed mining that contributes wealth to the 
world's poorer nations, it does promote worldwide acceptance 
that the deep seabed belongs to all people and is not to be 
carved up among nations. The extensive discussion of creating 
a new international law infused the emerging field of marine 
affairs with excitement and energy. 
This study is significant because few writers have 
examined the people behind the ideas that form the foundation 
of marine aff airs.13 Yet in other fields, the thinkers become 
13. Biographies have been written about Hugo Grotius, one of the founding fathers 
of international ocean law. See Edward Dumbauld, The Life and Legal Writings of 
Hugo Grotius (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969). 
6 
well known not only to those in the field but to the outside 
world. The public has learned about the fields of science, law, 
philosophy and history by examining inspirational leaders, 
their motivations and their choices. The author hopes that 
applying this same approach to a selected marine affairs 
doctrine will assist not only the academic community, but the 
general public to better understand the evolution of marine 
affairs. 
Some of the questions that are posed in this thesis are: 
Who are the primary thinkers who created and shaped the 
common heritage concept and what were their motivations? 
What were the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches 
taken by the people who promoted the idea? How broadly 
based were their constituencies? To what extent did the 
principle of the common heritage of mankind gain international 
acceptance as seen in United Nations resolutions and the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Sea? What might be the long 
term effect of the doctrine? 
The first chapter of this study is an examination of 
Ambassador Arvid Pardo's introduction of the concept of the 
common heritage of mankind in 1967. The chapter delves into 
some of the predecessors to Pardo's idea and explains the 
historical context in which Pardo defined the concept. It 
presents some background on Pardo and examines his 
motivations. The second chapter introduces some of the 
7 
advocates of the common heritage concept. Some of the 
strongest advocates were individual people who had worked 
for the causes of international peace and social justice. This 
chapter pays particular attention to the role that Elisabeth 
Mann Borgese, a German-born internationalist, played 
promoting Pardo's ideas and building an international 
constituency for a broad array of marine issues. The chapter 
also examines some of the fledgling United States 
nongovernmental groups that promoted the concept. The third 
chapter examines the marriage of the common heritage concept 
with the Third World aspirations for what was called a New 
International Economic Order. The fourth chapter is an analysis 
of what became of Pardo's idea for a common heritage regime 
for the oceans. The analysis looks at the policy that emerged in 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 
preparatory commission work after the treaty negotiations and 
the United States increasing disenchantment with the concept. 
The final chapter is a conclusion and evaluation of the common 
heritage of mankind concept. 
8 
Chapter I - The Common Heritage of Mankind is 
Introduced. 
Arvid Pardo, the ambassador from the tiny island 
country of Malta, submitted a proposal to the United Nations on 
August 17, 1967 that would contribute to a major change in 
global thinking. Ambassador Pardo said years later that he 
was motivated by a dream in 1967 when he proposed the 
General Assembly include on its agenda a "Declaration and 
Treaty concerning the reservation exclusively for peaceful 
purposes of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor, underlying the 
seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the 
use of their resources in the interests of mankind." 1 Pardo 
was also motivated by a deep desire to encourage a new style 
of international relations that would revamp the pattern of 
economic, political and geographic control by wealthy, 
industrialized nations.2 In a three-hour speech at the United 
Nations on November 1, i967, Pardo gave the world a first 
glimpse of his idea that the deep seabed and its resources 
should be considered the "common heritage of mankind." 
Pardo linked the common heritage idea to the history of 
ocean law. He suggested that the world had reached a new era 
in ocean use that demanded a novel legal concept to govern the 
L Arvid Pardo, telephone interview with author, 2 December 1991 and Note 
verbale from U.N. (Doc. A/6695), 17 August 1967. 
2. ibid., Note verbale. 
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previously ignored area of the deep seabed.3 His idea took 
hold in the late 1960s largely because it combined a number of 
international concerns including the ocean environment, 
disarmament, the future of lesser-developed countries and a 
critique of liberal capitalism. Global attention was turning 
toward the ocean as one of the last areas on earth that had not 
been claimed, explored or exploited. It was also a time when 
the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a 
scientific race to explore outer space. Leaders of smaller 
countries that had more at stake in the ocean than in outer 
space did not want to see the two global powers fight for 
control of the oceans and their resources. The danger that such 
a competition posed was not just that one side would lose 
resources to the other, but also of war on the planet. 
Pardo's idea also took hold because he was echoing some 
earlier suggestions of what should be done with the ocean's 
deep seabed and its resources. The precursors to Pardo's idea 
can be traced to ancient Roman Law. 
The Institutes of Justinian, the body of Roman law, states 
that under the Law of Nature "these things are common to 
mankind - the air, running water, the sea and consequently the 
shores of the sea."4 In Roman law these common areas were 
considered res nullius or res communis. Res nullius referred to 
something which while not owned could eventually be owned 
by someone. International law developed so that there were 
3~ U.N. (Doc. A/C.l/PV. 1515, 1516), 1 November 1967. 
4. Thomas C. Sandars, ed., The Institutes of Justinian (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1922), p. 90 
10 
various ways for countries to claim property said to be res 
nullius.5 However, if an area was considered res communis, it 
was owned by the community of mankind and therefore could 
not be claimed. Pardo drew from these ancient concepts when 
he fashioned his concept of the common heritage of mankind. 
His concept, as will be explained, resembled the res communis. 
Technology for off shore oil drilling and improved 
oceanographic research thrust the seabed into the international 
legal arena in 1958 at the First Conference on the Law of the 
Sea. Prince Wan Waithayakon of Thailand stated at that 
conference that the "sea is the common heritage of mankind."6 
However, the conference did not establish a legal regime for 
the seabed. It was not yet a compelling issue; the use of the 
seabed was still in the realm of science fiction for most people. 
During the 1950s and the 1960s, some people began 
suggesting that the United Nations be given jurisdiction over 
the seabed. The Commission to Study the Organization of 
Peace, an American group, urged in 1957 that the United 
Nations General Assembly · "declare the title of the international 
community" to the deep seabed and establish administrative 
arrangements. Clark Eichelberger, a member of the 
commission, a proponent of United Nations jurisdiction, 
5. Henry Black, Black's Law Dictionary ,5th Edition (St. Paul, Minn.: West 
Publishing Co., 1979), p. 1174. 
6. Cited in Bernardo Zuleta, "Introduction," San Diego Law Review, vol. 17 (1980): 
p. 524. 
1 1 
suggested it was a way of providing the international body 
with its first independent source of money .1 
Pardo's speech also echoed an idea that had at least been 
hinted at in American marine policy. Although he spoke in 
nowhere near the detail as Pardo, President Lyndon B. Johnson 
alluded to the concept of a common heritage on the seabed m 
1966 when he commissioned the USS Oceanographer and 
issued a report on the ocean composed by the President's 
Science Advisory Committee.8 The Johnson speech and the 
report entitled, Effective Use of the Sea,9 signaled that United 
States policy-makers were ready to address the seabed. 
Johnson's speech at the commissioning of the research vessel 
also demonstrated optimism about ocean policy. The 1960s 
were the American heydey in ocean policy .1 o The ocean was 
high on the national agenda for a combination of reasons 
including a rebirth in science education fueled by the space 
race between the Soviets and the Americans, specific ocean 
technology advances, the beginnings of an environmental 
movement stessing land and water protection and a search by 
the United States for ways of creating international bonds 
7. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Ocean 
Space, Hearings on Activities of Nations in Ocean Space, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 24 
July 1969, p. 150. 
8. Public Papers of the President, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, p. 722. 
9. Effective Use of the Sea, Report of the Panel on Oceanography of the President's 
Science Advisory Committee (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
June 1966). 
10. Lauriston R. King and Feenan D. Jennings, "The Executive and the Oceans: 
Three Decades of United States Marine Policy," Marine Technology Society Journal, 
vol. 22, no. 1 (1988): p. 17-32. 
12 
through programs such as the Peace Corps, Food for Peace and 
the U.S. Administration for International Development. The 
tone of the era was set by the grandiose idealism of Johnson's 
Great Society programs. The language President Johnson used 
in his July 13, 1966 dedication of the Oceanographer gives a 
flavor of the attitude toward the ocean at the time. 
"We meet here today at the beginning of a new age of 
exploration," Johnson told a gathering at Pier 2 in the 
Washington Navy Yard. "To some this might mean our 
adventures in outer space. But I am speaking of exploring an 
unknown world at our doorstep. It is really our last frontier 
here on earth. I am speaking of the mountain chains that are 
yet to be discovered, of natural resources that are yet to be 
tapped, of a vast wilderness that is yet to be charted. 
This is the sea around us." 1 1 
Not only does the speech's rhetoric tap into the American 
myth of the frontier, but it also alludes to the best-selling book 
on the ocean published by Rachel Carson · in 1951.12 In the 
speech, Johnson explained that the Oceanographer, one of the 
Coast and Geodetic Survey's fourteen research ships, would 
improve the country's understanding of the ocean. He said 
federal · support for marine science was on the rise from an 
estimated $21 million in 1950 to $320 million in 1960. He 
stressed the need for cooperation especially between the Soviet 
Union and the United States in scientific research and he 
11. Public Papers, LBJ, p. 722. 
12. Rachel Carson, The Sea Around Us (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951 ). 
1 3 
announced that the nation would invite other countries to 
participate in a round-the-world voyage of the Oceanographer. 
In the closing sentences of his speech, Johnson called the ocean 
floor a "legacy to all humans." 
We greatly welcome this type of international 
participation. Because under no circumstances, we 
believe, must we ever allow the prospects of rich 
harvests and mineral wealth to create a new form of 
colonial competition among the maritime nations. We 
must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the 
lands under the high seas. We must ensure that the deep 
seas and the ocean bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of 
all human beings.13 
On the same day that Johnson delivered this speech, he 
also issued Effective Use of the Sea. The report was the result 
of a year of study and work by the President's Science 
Advisory Committee, a group composed predominantly of 
academics. It appeared just as Congress was enacting the 
Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act . Both the 
report and the act concluded that the Un~ted States lacked an 
adequate program to "explore, understand and develop the 
oceans." 14 The report detailed a history of American 
ignorance of the vast oceans at its western and eastern 
doorsteps. It echoed some of the conclusions of a 1959 report 
by a National Academy of Science Committee on Oceanography 
which said the United States was uncompetitive and not in an 
international leadership position in oceanography. Effective Use 
13. Public Papers, LBJ, 722. 
14. Effective Use of the Sea, p. vii. 
14 
of the Sea recommended establishing a new agency to oversee 
ocean and atmosphere issues. The phrase, common heritage of 
mankind, was not used in Effective Use of the Sea, however, the 
report urged "cooperative, international efforts to develop 
marine resources for the benefit of humanity." And it urged 
the United States to assert itself quickly or risk losing a voice m 
an emerging new order for the oceans. I 5 
During the summer of 1966, Congress also enacted the 
Great Society's program for the ocean, called the Marine 
Resources and Engineering Development Act.16 This act 
created the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and 
Resources, a 15-member president-appointed body to identify 
national objectives for ocean research, environmental 
protection and fish and resource development. The commission, 
headed by Julius Stratton, was made up of appointees drawn 
from government, industry, universities and laboratories. It 
issued a report, called the Stratton Report, in 1969, calling for 
major national ocean technology improvements, a federal-state 
coastal zone management program, improved use and 
management of national and international fisheries and greater 
national attention to the formation of international 
cooperatives to use and protect the deep oceans. 
The Johnson speech and the Stratton Commission's 
beginnings were in the background when Pardo made his 
15. Ibid., p. 3. 
16. Our Nation and The Sea: A Plan for National Action, Report of the Commission 
on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1969). 
1 5 
speech. Also, the World Peace Through Law Center, an 
organization representing more than 200 lawyers from 100 
countries, resolved in July 1967 that there should be an 
international regime to manage the deep seabed. New York 
lawyer Aaron L. Danzig organized the meeting of the United 
Nations Committee of the World Peace Through Law Center 
which recommended to its parent organization that the high 
seas and all its fish and mineral resources be subject to U .N. 
jurisdiction. The parent body, however, limited the 
recommendation to non-fishery resources of the high seas. The 
organization resolved: 
Whereas, new technology and oceanography have 
revealed the possibility of exploitation of untold 
resources of the high seas and the bed thereof 
beyond the continental shelf and more than half of 
mankind finds itself underprivileged, underfed and 
underdeveloped, and the high seas are the common 
heritage of all mankind .1 7 
Pardo disagreed with the idea of placing the United 
Nations in charge of this vast territory and made this clear m 
his speech. In this way, he deviated from a number of thinkers. 
Calling United Nations oversight impractical, Pardo thought it 
"hardly · likely that those countries that have already developed 
a technical capability to exploit the seabed would agree to an 
international regime if it were administered by a body where 
small countries, such as mine, had the same voting power as 
17. Lewis Alexander, ed., International Rules and Organization for the Sea: 
Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, June 
24-27, 1968 (Kingston, RI: The University of Rhode Island, 1968), p. 375. 
I 6 
the United States or the Soviet Union."18 He suggested that 
industrialized countries should have more to say about 
managing the seabed than the lesser developed countries. 
Pardo also laid out in clear language (I) the reasons for a new 
concept in ocean management, (2) the danger in not creating a 
new legal concept for governing the oceans (3) the specific 
advantages of exploiting the seabed and ( 4) a general design 
for a regime to govern the ocean as a common heritage of 
mankind. 
Pardo noted in his speech that the nations of the world 
had accepted the concept of freedom of the seas as defined by 
Hugo Grotius in the seventeenth century .19 This concept 
covered the uses of the water component of the seas, but Pardo 
believed it did not address the seabed beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction. 
Around the use of the surface and upper layers of 
the seas a complex body of international law has 
developed; but the depths of the oceans and the ocean 
floor were of little interest until little more than a 
hundred years ago when the question of laying 
transatlantic cable came to the fore.20 
P~do also stressed the need for a new legal concept 
because he believed the 1958 United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea Convention on the Continental Shelf had left 
ambiguity in the definition of the continental shelf. He 
18. U.N. (Doc. A/C.l/PV.1516), 1 November 1967. 
19. Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations, 5th Edition (London: Macmillan 
Publishing Co., 1986), p. 31. 
20. U.N. ( Doc. A/C.l/PV.1515), 1 November 1967. 
17 
maintained the treaty's definition gave nations freedom to 
broadly interpret how far the continental shelf extended and 
thus the extent of a nation's right to exploit the resources of the 
shelf. National territory at the time Pardo gave his speech 
extended for many, but not all nations, to a three-mile 
territorial sea. Beyond this, the 1958 treaty gave a nation 
rights to exploit the natural resources of the continental shelf, 
but did not grant sovereignty over the shelf to coastal states.2 1 
Pardo referred to the following section of the 1958 convention 
when he argued that it left a dangerous ambiguity and left 
room for international disputes over where a nation's shelf 
ended and the seabed began . 
... the term continental shelf is used as referring (a) to the 
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the 
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a 
depth of 200 metres or, beyond the limit, to where 
the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas ... 2 2 
Under such a definition, technology . and the ability to 
exploit would define where the shelf ended and the seabed 
began. Obviously it gave clear advantages to nations with 
superior technology and Pardo was worried it might encourage 
these nations to make claims to the deep seabed area. 
Pardo urged that a new legal framework for the vast 
ocean seabed should be established before governments used 
21. 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, Art. 2, 29 April 1958, Treaties and Other International Acts 
Series 5 5 7 8 . 
22. Ibid. Art. 1. 
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current international law to justify occupation, military 
buildup, nuclear weapons installation or commercial 
exploitation of the seabed. He wanted to devise a new concept 
for the ocean that differed from the legal concept of res nullius 
which formed the philosophical foundation for the concept of 
freedom of the seas. Under the concept of res nullius, there are 
parts of the globe that are owned by no one. But internationally 
accepted legal methods exist to gain sovereignty over these 
areas. The primary method is through discovery and 
occupation. 23 The concept of res nullius ushered in the age of 
exploration and allowed Europeans to claim continents and 
colonize peoples who did not have the same form of written, 
international law. 
Pardo's idea of the common heritage of mankind more 
closely resembled the Roman legal concept called "res 
communis." Under the concept of res communis, an area may 
not be appropriated and the use of it belongs equally to all 
people.24 This is the philosophical underpinning of the 
common heritage concept. However, Pardo and other scholars 
have pointed out that the common heritage concept went 
beyond res communis because it included "the actual sharing of 
the benefits" derived from an area or resource.25 Pardo said 
in a statement made on March 20, 1969 that there was a 
distinction between res communis and the common heritage of 
23. von Glahn, Law Among Nations, p. 315-327. 
24. Milan Bulajic, Principles of International Development Law (Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), p. 305. 
25. Ibid., p. 305-306. 
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mankind. He defined res commums as an area "usable for any 
convenient purpose." He said that the resources in such an area 
are indiscriminately and competitively exploitable. However, 
he said the common heritage area had a "special status" 
because it would be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes 
and would be "administered by an international agency in the 
name and for the benefit of all peoples and of present and 
future generations. "26 Pardo observed that the existing 
international law would allow powerful nations to claim the 
deep seabed and its mineral resources in the same way that 
the European nations had carved Africa into colonies in the 
nineteenth century. 
Unfortunately the present juridical framework 
clearly encourages, subject to certain limitations, the 
appropriation for national purposes of the sea-bed 
beyond the geophysical continental shelf. As I have 
already had occasion to mention, the sea-bed and the 
ocean floor are land. There are five generally recognized 
modes of acquiring land in international law: cession, 
subjugation, accretion, prescription ~nd occupation. 27 
In this statement, Pardo criticized the international law 
that allowed nations to acquire land. Cession is the "formal 
transfer of title from one state to another.28 Subjugation is the 
"firm military conquest" of a people and their territory.29 
Roman law defined accretion as the gradual deposit of soil by a 
26. Arvid Pardo, The Common Heritage: Selected Papers on Oceans and World Order 
1967-1974 (Malta: Malta University Press, 1975), p. 67. 
27. U.N. (Doc. A/C.l/PV. 1515), 1 November 1967. 
28. von Glahn, Law Among Nations, p. 318. 
29. Ibid., p. 638. 
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river or ocean along the shore. The law gave the owner of the 
river bank or shore the right to the newly accreted land.3 O 
Prescription means that a "foreign state occupies a portion of 
territory claimed by another state, encounters no protests by 
the owner, and exercises rights of sovereignty. "31 Occupation is 
a situation in which a nation takes over, occupies territory and 
eventually owns the land. 
Pardo urged that no one be allowed under old rules of 
international law to own the seabed. He wanted to introduce a 
concept in international law that promoted equality and social 
welfare for poorer nations in current and future generations.3 2 
This was a significant departure from international law 
concerned with traditional security issues. Pardo's concept of 
the common heritage was part of a larger trend in international 
relations that would continue into the 1970s. Welfare issues 
such as sharing resources emerged at this time because it was 
possible to pay less attention to security issues. The East-West 
detente gave nations a chance to shift focus toward issues such 
as the ocean and the environment.3 3 
To stress his belief in the need for new law and the 
danger of inaction, Pardo said that the United States had 
already. begun leasing tracts of underwater land well beyond 
30. Ibid., p. 316. 
31. Ibid., p. 317. 
32. For more information on the shift in international legal philosophy from 
traditional security to human welfare concerns see Julius Stone, Visions of World 
Order: Between State Power and Human Justice (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1984). 
33. Donald J. Puchala and Stuart I. Fagan, "International Politics in the 1970s: the 
Search for a Perspective," International Organization, vol. 28, no. 2 (1974): p. 2 
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territorial waters. He warned that this trend would continue 
unless an international body established a new legal regime to 
protect the deep seabed from creeping national claims. 
The process has already started and will lead to a 
competitive scramble for sovereign rights over the land 
underlying the world's seas and oceans, surpassing in 
magnitude and in its implication last century's colonial 
scramble for territory in Asia and Africa. The 
consequences will be very grave: at the very least a 
dramatic escalation of the arms race and sharply 
increasing world tensions, caused also by the intolerable 
injustice that would reserve the plurality of the world's 
resources for the exclusive benefit of less than a handful 
of nations. The strong will get stronger, the rich 
richer and among the rich themselves there would arise 
an increasing and insuperable differentiation between 
two or three and the remainder. Between the very few 
dominant Powers, suspicions and tensions would reach 
unprecedented levels. Traditional activities of the high 
seas would be curtailed.3 4 
One weakness of Pardo's speech was that he cited only 
one source - Mineral Resources of the Sea , by the American 
engineer, John Mero, when estimating the specific economic 
advantages of seabed mining. 
In his book Mr. Mero states that manganese 
~odules could be mined, transported to port and 
processed at a cost of some $28.5 per ton, as compared to 
gross commercial value of recoverable metal content 
ranging from $40 to $100 per ton.35 
34. U.N. (Doc. A/C.l/PV.1515), 1 Novemer 1967. 
35. Ibid. 
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The press release issued by the United Nations to 
newspapers noted that Pardo's estimated $5 billion could be 
raised by 1975 from seabed mining.36 This figure was Pardo's 
extrapolation of Mero's estimates.This was a weak part of the 
speech because the knowledge about the seabed and its 
resources was in its infancy. Within a few years, Pardo's 
predictions would seem ridiculously optimistic. 
In the final section of his speech, Pardo delineated for the 
first time the components of the common heritage concept as 
applied to the deep seabed. First, it was a concept that 
provided for exploitation of a natural area to benefit all 
mankind. Second, the area was to be used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes. Third, the international community was to 
have jurisdiction, but not sovereignty over the common 
heritage of mankind area and resources. An agency that 
represents the international community would act as a "trustee 
for all countries over the oceans and the ocean floor to regulate, 
supervise and control all activities on or · under the oceans and 
the ocean floor," Pardo said.37 The concept would promote 
exploitation of resources in the interests of mankind, with ( 
particular regard for the needs of poor countries and scientific 
research to be conducted freely by all with the results shared 
by all. 
36. Sam Pope Brewer, "Malta Warns UN on Radioactive Pollution at Sea," New York 
Times, 2 November 1967, p. 12. 
37. U.N. (Doc. A/C.l/PV.1515), 1 November 1967. 
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Nearly twenty years later, Christopher C. Joyner defined 
the concept of the common heritage of mankind in nearly 
identical fashion, a testament to the lasting power of Pardo's 
original definition. Joyner described five principle elements to 
the concept of the common heritage of mankind. They are that 
(1) common space areas would legally be owned by no one, (2) 
all people would be expected to share in the management of a 
common space area, (3) economic benefits from natural 
resources exploited from the common space would be shared 
internationally, ( 4) use of the common space area would be 
limited to peaceful purposes and (5) scientific research would 
be conducted freely and openly and not threaten the 
environment. The results should be "freely and publicly 
exchanged in hopes of fostering greater scientific co-operation 
and more extensive knowledge of the region. "38 The major 
differences between the views of Pardo and Joyner was Pardo's 
insistence that the common heritage of mankind be used 
primarily for the poor of the world. Joyner gave no preference 
to any social group, but he did reflect a greater awareness of 
the need to protect the environment. 
These differences can be attributed to the different 
decades. The 1960s were a period when leaders talked about 
social responsibility. This was reflected in Pardo's desire to use 
the fruits of the sea to raise the living standards of the poor m 
developing countries. The late 1960s was a period of 
38. Christopher C. Joyner, "Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common 
Heritage of Mankind," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 35 
(1986): p. 191-192. 
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international idealism. In America, President Lyndon Johnson 
had launched the War on Poverty and Martin Luther King Jr. 
was leading a civil rights movement to raise the political, 
economic and social possibilities for black people. Africans 
were struggling in newly created countries to establish 
governments and devise ways to feed, educate and employ 
starving masses. Pardo's speech came at a time when the size 
and character of the United Nations was also changing each 
year. For example in 1966, the United Nations membership was 
121 nations, almost three times the original founding 
membership of 1945.39 
At this time, America was engaged in a bloody and 
controversial conflict in Vietnam, but President Johnson was 
also concerned about promoting international peace whether it 
was through international aid programs or ocean development 
ideas. In 1966, Johnson urged Congress to approve $3 .3 billion 
a year in aid for a new program he called Food For Freedom to 
assist the nations - predominantly in Africa - where people 
were starving. 40 That same year, Johnson gave his speech 
identifying the ocean as a new arena for international 
cooperation. 
The 1960s were also a time when capitalism was 
criticized by a number of world leaders. On March 28, 1967, 
Pope Paul VI issued a papal encyclical entitled "On the 
Development of Peoples" in which he urged "unselfish 
39. Luman H. Long, ed., The World Almanac 1967 (New York: Newspaper Enterprise 
Association, 1966), p. 678. 
40. Ibid., p. 678. 
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nonpolitical action for economic and social justice." He 
condemned what he called the "evils of unrestrained 
capitalism. "41 He said the right of property should be 
subordinate to the common good. 
This was the 1960s. The 1980s, on the other hand, were 
not known for altruism on national or world levels. The global 
economy had deteriorated. The economically powerful Asian 
countries of Japan, Korea and Taiwan were beginning to 
displace the western powers. National leaders like Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher were preaching an anti-
government, pro-private enterprise philosophy. A philosophy 
that was nearly the opposite of the international idealism of 
the late 1960s common heritage concept. However, by the 
1980s, the environment was firmly on the agenda of 
international relations. It was recognized as linked to global 
political stability. 
Pardo's speech suggested that the international regime 
should ( 1) oversee commercial mining 2} assure that the area 
be used only for peaceful purposes and 3) be responsible for 
curbing ocean pollution. He stressed that international 
management would promote peace and security: international 
mining ·for oil, gas and other minerals would free the world 
community of dependence on more politically sensitive land 
sources. He also stressed this as a reason for the 
technologically-advanced countries to favor an international 
41. Robert C. Doty, "Pope Paul Calls for Urgent Steps to Aid Poor Lands," New York 
Times, 29 March 1967, p. 1. 
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regime. These countries depended on some of the lesser 
developed countries in Africa and Latin America for raw 
materials such as oil and minerals.42 He claimed an 
international regime for the deep sea could prevent 
international conflict over valuable resources. 
As will be seen, Pardo's background as an internationalist 
influenced his decision to champion the principle of the 
common heritage of mankind. His position as ambassador from 
Malta, a 122 square-mile nation in the Mediterranean, also 
assisted him in the promotion of the idea. Malta fell on neither 
side of the North-South debate or of the Cold War division 
between the Soviet bloc countries and the United States. This 
gave Pardo credibility through neutrality. 
The idea also was a way for Pardo to combine some of his 
previous work at the United Nations on disarmament issues, UN 
reorganization ideas and Third World development concerns. 
Pardo joined the United Nations staff in September 1946, one 
year after he was freed from a German concentration camp m 
Berlin. During the Second World War, he founded an 
underground movement in Italy to aid the Allies. He was 
imprisoned by the Mussolini government in 1940 and spent 
two years in solitary confinement at the Regina Coeli prison in 
Rome. In October, 1943, he was deported to Germany and put 
42. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Report of the 
Congressional Research Service on Deep Seabed Minerals: Resources, Diplomacy 
and Strategic Interest, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1 March 1978, p. 60. 
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in the concentration camp at Grossbeeren and later moved to 
the Alexander Platz prison in Berlin. 4 3 
He served as acting chief of archives at the UN, worked 
for the division of "Non-Self-Governing territories," was the 
representative of the U.N. Development Program in Nigeria 
from 1961-63 and Ecuador from 1963-64. When Malta gained 
its independence from the United Kingdom in 1964, the new 
Maltese prime minister, Giorgio Borg Olivier, asked Pardo, a 
personal friend, to serve as the nation's first ambassador to the 
United Nations.44 A year before his famous speech in 1967, 
Pardo introduced a resolution to control the trade of 
weapons.45 Pardo served as the Maltese ambassador until 
1970 when a new government took over Malta. He then 
worked as a civil servant at the United Nations and later sought 
a professorship in the United States. He was a professor of 
international relations and senior research fellow at the 
University of Southern California. He is currently retired m 
Texas. Before his UN work, Pardo had received a degree m 
history from the University of Tours and a doctorate in 
international law from the University of Rome. 
This background helps explain why Pardo's concept for 
the deep seabed was his idea and not part of Malta's national 
agenda. "I had to be careful. The idea was never cleared with 
the voters of Malta," Pardo said. "I was not eager to develop the 
43. Pardo, Common Heritage, p. i. 
44. Arvid Pardo, telephone interview with author, 2 December 1991. 
45. Pardo, Common Heritage, p. v. 
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full implications of the common heritage of mankind m an 
explicit manner. "46 
Pardo chose to champion an international regime for the 
deep seabed because he viewed this remote region of the world 
as a safe place to shape a new form of international 
cooperation. 47 He had no experience with mineral mining. He 
was not an oceanographer although he had a layman's interest 
in the technological advances that were opening up man's 
knowledge of the deep ocean and demanding, in his opinion, an 
international management regime. 
"I had nowhere else to go," said Pardo when he described 
why he chose to suggest the common heritage of mankind 
concept be applied to the deep seabed. "If I had said ocean 
space, the matter never would have been accepted. The seabed 
was the only place on earth that did not have the beginnings of 
a legal structure. "4 8 
Pardo elaborated on his idea of a new international 
organization that he thought would work better than the 
United Nations in his 197 i draft international ocean space 
treaty. His and other proposed treaties were presented to the 
United Nations Sea-bed Committee, a body set up in 1968 by 
the United Nations General Assembly to study the uses and 
management of the seabed.49 He . wanted to give certain 
46. Arvid Pardo, telephone interview with author, 2 December 1991. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid. 
49. Shigeru Oda, ed., The International Law of the Ocean Development (Leyden: 
Sijthoff International Publishing Co., 1972), p. 148. 
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privileges and rights to the countries most affected by the 
marine environment. To do this he suggested the seabed 
regime have an assembly made up of representatives from 
each nation. However, these members would be broken down 
into three categories: coastal states with a population exceeding 
90 million, all remaining coastal states and non-coastal states. 
Decisions made by the assembly would be taken by an 
affirmative vote of the majority and by a majority of members 
belonging to two of these three sub-categories.5 o 
Pardo thought the United Nations General Assembly 
system was unwieldy and believed a new system that gave 
appropriate weight to nations with concerns about the marine 
environment would be fairer and effective. However, his 
design was not that different from the United Nations General 
Assembly where each nation has one vote. What was different 
was that there was no Security Council, a body that gives veto 
power to a select group of historically powerful nations. 
Instead, power was distributed based on ·ocean reliance and 
population. 
Despite President Johnson's speech about the ocean and 
other proposals to internationalize management of the deep 
seabed,· the United States was caught off guard by Pardo's 
common heritage concept. Congress reacted unfavorably 
beginning in the fall of 1967 when word spread about Malta's 
August 17th note verbale suggesting a seabed regime. House 
50. Oda, International Law of the Ocean Development, p. 174-5 
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members introduced 22 resolutions specifically opposing 
"vesting title to the ocean floor in the United Nations. "5 1 
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee 
on International Organizations reviewed the resolutions and 
concluded that it would be premature and unwise to vest 
jurisdiction over the seabed in a new international 
organization. The subcommittee recommended the United 
States actively discourage any action that might "prejudice 
national interests in exploration, use and economic 
exploitation "52 of the seabed. During a month of hearings on 
the resolutions, the subcommittee heard from Ronald Reagan, 
who was governor of California at the time, that he was 
strongly against an international regime for the deep ocean. 
President George Bush, a member of the House from Texas at 
the time, also authored a resolution against vesting title to the 
seabed in an international organization.53 Amid the flood of 
opposition there was one resolution in favor of encouraging the 
United Nations to develop a regime for the deep seabed that 
would provide a source of ·revenue for poor nations and the 
51. Quote~ from House Joint Resolution 816, 90th Cong., 1st sess. This resolution 
and 21 similarly worded resolutions were the subject of hearings by the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations from 
22 September to 31 October 1967. For testimony and descriptions of House Joint 
Resolutions 816-824, 828-829, 834-837, 840, 843-844, 850, 856, 865, 876 and 
916 see House Report No. 999, Interim Report on The United Nations and the Issue 
of the Deep Ocean Resources, 90th Cong. 1st sess., 7 December 1967. 
52. Ibid., p. 4R-5R. 
53. See copy of telegram from Gov. Reagan to Rep. Dante B. Fascell of Florida, 
chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, reprinted in House 
Report No. 999, p. 33. For Rep. Bush-sponsored resolution see p. 77. 
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United Nations. House Resolution 558 was sponsored by Rep. 
Jonathan B. Bingham of New York.54 
The infant American mineral extraction industry turned 
to Congress in the late 1960s with concerns that Pardo had 
proposed a socialistic international regime that would control 
and thwart their efforts to begin deep seabed mining.5 5 
Congress wanted to protect the mineral extraction industry's 
rights of access to the seabed. Sen. Lee Metcalf, the chairman of 
the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, 
Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels, asked the 
American Mining Congress to draft national legislation that 
would protect seabed miners.5 6 
However, within the Senate, Sen. Claiborne Pell, a 
Democrat from Rhode Island, embraced some of the 
components of Pardo's idea. In the same month as the speech, 
Pell sponsored two resolutions, one which favored an 
international regime and the other which lay down a set of 
"basic principles for governing the seabed" to be recommended 
to the United Nations Gen.era! Assembly.57 Pell's Senate 
Resolution 186 laid down a "Declaration of Legal Principles 
Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Exploitation of Ocean Space" which differed from Pardo's idea 
because it trumpeted the age old concept of freedom of the 
54. Ibid., p. 77. 
55. Ann L. Rollick and Robert E. Osgood, New Era of Ocean Politics (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 22. 
56. Ibid., p. 58. 
57. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on Governing 
the Use of Ocean Space, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 29 November 1967. 
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seas and did not suggest that be replaced. "All states have the 
right for their nationals to engage in fishing, aquaculture and 
in-solution mining in the high seas beyond 12 miles from the 
coast ... ," the Pell principles said.58 Unlike Pardo, Pell 
recommended an appropriate authority designated by the 
United Nations issue licenses to nations for the exploitation of 
seabed . nonliving resources and living resources that are 
"sedentary species." Pardo had suggested an independent 
international regime have broad powers to manage the 
resources of the deep sea. He wanted a separate government as 
if this region of the ocean would be a new country. 
Pell's suggestion arose from the American philosophy of 
minimizing regulation. The primary goal of the proposal was to 
allow for orderly and efficient exploitation of the seabed. It did 
not aim to create a new source of money to feed the hungry or 
promote development in the world's poorer nations. Pell 
wanted to ensure world order and protect international 
security. However, he agreed with Pardo's· idea of decreeing the 
seabed and subsoil be used for peaceful purposes and be 
protected from environmental harm. Pell does not mention the 
"common heritage of mankind," however his declaration states 
that there is a "common interest of all mankind in the progress 
of the exploration of ocean space and the exploitation of the 
resources in ocean space for peaceful purposes. "59 The 
principles encouraged international cooperation in science, but 
58. Ibid, p. 4. 
59. Ibid., p. 3. 
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did not take the step that Pardo had taken of saying that 
scientific information compiled by one country on the deep 
seabed should · be the property of all countries. 
Pell said that if the principles were followed, they would 
give "the edge to those nations who now are most 
technologically advanced and thus most able to take advantage 
of the resources. "60 Pell and the Assistant Secretary of State, 
Joseph Sisco, had difficulty with Pardo' s idea that lesser 
developed countries should be given preferential treatment m 
the use of resources from this new territory - the deep 
seabed.6 1 
Pardo had begun the process of changing international 
marine policy by identifying and defining the concept of the 
common heritage and how it should be applied to the deep 
ocean seabed. It was clear from the start and would become 
clearer that he took a philosophical approach and not a 
traditional legal approach. The idea and the approach might 
have gone completely unnoticed in 1967 ·had not a number of 
other forces helped to bring it to the fore. Among those forces 
were the discussions in the United States of a need to better 
understand and use the oceans. Like Pardo, key United States 
policy-makers including President Johnson and Vice President 
Hubert H. Humphrey 62 considered the ocean a vehicle for a 
60. Ibid, p. 13. 
61. Ibid., p. 21. 
62. See letter from Humphrey to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Subcommittee on Ocean Space, Hearings on Activities of Nations in Ocean Space, 
91st Cong., 1st sess., 24, 25, 28 and 30 July 1969, p. 249. 
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number of goals, not just improved use of ocean resources such 
as fish or minerals. The president's science advisory 
commission report Effective Use of the Sea stressed the 
ambitious idea that Americans should apply their know ledge 
from land development to the ocean and should use the ocean 
to foster international cooperation in both exploration and 
exploitation. The report also stressed the security risks 
presented by this massive unclaimed area. It encouraged the 
United States to increase its presence in the ocean in order to 
prevent future security threats. Sen. Pell also advocated that 
the United States take a leadership role in the debate over how 
the deep sea should be governed. He saw that other countries 
were getting involved in this debate and feared the United 
States would lose ground if it did not jump into the fray with 
positive proposals of its own. 
35 
Chapter II - The Advocates 
The idea of the deep seabed as a common heritage of 
mankind attracted a fervent following among a small group of 
private citizens who formed fledgling nongovernmental 
organizations. NGOs, as they are now called, were not new to 
international politics, however, they were gaining importance 
in the 1970s.1 The motivations of some of the NGOs that took 
up the cause of the common heritage of mankind varied as did 
the way each defined the concept. As with Pardo and political 
figures from the United States, each NGO leader brought a 
different set of desires to the concept and tried to use the 
common heritage of mankind as a vehicle to achieve his or her 
goals. 
Elizabeth Mann Borgese was a researcher at the Center 
for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, 
California in 1967 when she read about Arvid Pardo's United 
Nations speech on the common heritage of mankind. At the 
time, she was reviving her interests in international relations 
and Pardo's speech reminded her of work she had done with 
her late husband, Guiseppe Borgese, on a World Constitution 
published in the 1940s. After the United Nation's speech, 
Borgese invited the Maltese ambassador to visit the center, a 
think tank headed by the renowned American educator, Robert 
1. A. Leroy Bennett, International Organizations, Principles and Issues (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1977), p. 354. 
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Maynard Hutchins.2 In the next decade, Borgese and Pardo 
refined the concept of the common heritage of mankind 
through their writings. 
Much like Arvid Pardo, Borgese was a person without a 
country. She came from a European intellectual family that was 
uprooted by World War II; a family that lived in exile in the 
United States and never could return to the intellectual and 
cultural milieu obliterated by the war. Borgese was the fifth of 
six children born to the German writer Thomas Mann and his 
wife Katia. She was born in Munich during the final days of 
World War I and grew up in a household that was a center for 
the literati of Europe. As the Nazis came to power in Germany, 
her father moved away from his early nationalistic orientation 
and began to criticize the Nazis.3 . His criticism eventually led 
him and his family into exile first in Zurich, Switzerland in 
1933 and later in the United States. 
Borgese was influenced by her father's coterie of exiles 
who dreamed of creating a world where fascism and Nazism 
could not sprout anew. The dream infused her with a strong 
desire at an early age to create some lasting improvement in 
world governance. At the age of 21, she married Guiseppe 
Borgese, a man who was 56 years old at the time. She had read 
his book, Goliath: The March of Fascism, tracing the rise of 
Italian fascism and decided he was the man she wanted to 
2~ Elizabeth Mann Borgese, interview with author, Halifax, Canada, I November 
1991. 
3. Borgese, correspondence with author, 12 February 1992. 
37 
marry although she had never met him. 4 Borgese's deliberate 
marriage to a husband much older than her in the face of 
parental disapproval was early evidence of her strong will. 
Also, her attachment to the abstract ideas that were a part of 
Guiseppe Borgese's books became a personal trademark that 
would later be one of the reasons the idea of the "common 
heritage of mankind" so intrigued her. 
During the 1930s and early 1940s, the Borgeses worked 
together at the University of Chicago where Guiseppe Borgese 
was a professor of political science and international relations. 
With the approval of University Chancellor Robert Maynard 
Hutchins, Guiseppe Borgese brought together a group of 
intellectuals to draft a proclamation warning of worldwide 
danger to political freedom. The group, which included 
Reinhold Niebuhr and Lewis Mumford, wrote and published a 
book, entitled The City of Man, that described their hopes for a 
just international order. 5 But the book had little impact. Lewis 
Mumford later said of it: "Our book sold perhaps 8,000 to 
10,000 copies, and at best reinforced the convictions of a 
minute number of already awakened minds. "6 This criticism 
could be applied to much of the work that Guiseppe Borgese 
did. He. operated m an intellectual world cut off from both the 
4. Borgese interview, 1 Nov. 1991. See also Giuseppe A. Borgese, Goliath: The March 
of Fascism (NY: Viking Press, 1937). 
5. Harry S. Ashmore, Unseasonable Truths: The Life of Robert Maynard Hutchins 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1989), p. 206. See also H. Agar, F. Aydelotte, 
G~A. Borgese et al., The City of Man: A Declaration on World Democracy (New York: 
The Viking Press, 1940). 
6. Ashmore, Unseasonable Truths, p. 207. 
38 
mainstream of American society and European society in which 
he had grown up. 
While these manifestos for creating a just society 
grounded in international cooperation made little impact, 
Elisabeth Borgese did not forget them. She became the carrier 
of the hopes and ideas of both her father and husband when 
both men died during the 1950s. 
In 1964 Hutchins asked Borgese to be the first woman to 
join the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. He 
wanted her to resurrect the work she and her husband had 
done in Chicago as founding members of the Committee to 
Frame A World Constitution. The committee, founded in 1945, 
had been influenced by the concerns Hutchins had about the 
development of the atomic bomb, a project in which University 
of Chicago scientists were playing key consulting roles. 7 
Hutchins went so far as to urge Secretary of State, James F. 
Byrnes, never to use the bomb. But his pleading did not stop 
the test explosion at Alamogordo, New Mexico during the 
summer of 1945 or the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki m 
August. Hutchins also took a dim view of the newly formed 
United Nations. He believed it "was fated to join the League of 
Nations· as another monument to postwar disillusionment." 8 
This was the backdrop for a suggestion by Guiseppe Borgese 
and Dean McKeon of the humanities division at the University 
7. Ibid., p. 252. 
8. Ibid., p. 262. 
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of Chicago that they draft a world constitution. Guiseppe 
Borgese said at the time: 
"A world constitution is needed ... the deadline being the 
day, unpredicted but not remote, when the atomic secret 
will be in other hands. We do not think a world 
constitution or a preliminary project will be drafted by 
bureaucratic or diplomatic bodies. Their motions are 
inhibited by statutory routines; their initiatives, even in 
this most open-minded of nations, must stop at the 
dogmatic wall of national sovereignty. 9 
These words would be echoed by the work and thought 
of Borgese's wife long after his death in 1952. She believed that 
people outside the regular channels of government and 
diplomacy had a significant role to play in articulating the 
structure of a new international order. As idealist draftsmen, 
people like herself would articulate ideas in the hope of moving 
society forward. These beliefs underpinned the 
nongovernmental organization that Elisabeth Borgese founded 
in 1970, The International Ocean Institute, and the annual 
conferences she has sponsored for 20 years called Pacem in 
Maribus or Peace in the Oceans. The title of the organization 
was a deliberate reference to Pope John XXIII Pacem in Terris 
message. At these conferences, Borgese attempted to expand 
the con'stituency for the oceans by involving scientists, 
geographers, philosophers and political thinkers from around 
the world in discussions of ocean issues. Some of the people 
that Borgese brought to these annual conferences included Alva 
Myrdal, the Swedish cabinet minister and disarmament 
9. Ibid., p. 262. 
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activist; Jovan Djordjevic, a Yugoslav Constitutional lawyer and 
one of the architects of the 1963 Yugoslav Constitution; 
Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe, the Ambassador of Ceylon to 
the United Nations, the chairman of the United Nations Sea-bed 
Committee and the man who presided over the United Nations 
Law of the Sea Conference until his death in 1980; Lord Ritchie 
Calder, a former professor of international relations at the 
University of Edinburgh; and Norton Ginsburg, a professor of 
geography at the University of Chicago. IO 
As Elisabeth Borgese dusted off the World Constitution 
written just after World War II, she realized the document was 
just as idealistic and unrealistic as it had been in the 1945 .1 I 
During that period, the constitution had been ripped apart by 
the Chicago Tribune and called a subversive document that 
advocated the abolition of the United States as well as all other 
countries. It was also criticized for challenging the American 
belief in private property. At the heart of the document was 
the statement that four elements of life "earth, water, air and 
energy are the common property of the human race." 12 This 
idea did not spring newborn from the members of the 
Committee to Frame a World Constitution. It was a restatement 
of ancient beliefs expressed in Greek and Roman law that the 
earth, the water and air belonged to . all people. I 3 
10. E.M. Borgese, Pacem In M aribus (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1972), p. 323. 
11. Borgese interview, 1 Nov. 1991. 
12. G.A. Borgese, Foundations of the World Republic (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1953), p. 305. 
13. "By the law of nature these things are common to mankind - the air, running 
water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea," according to Thomas C. 
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When Borgese read about Pardo's speech on the common 
heritage of mankind, it reminded her of the ideas she was 
contemplating as secretary for the Committee to Frame a World 
Constitution. Only this time, in 1967, she said she believed that 
the timing was right to apply the ideas to a real, political world. 
Borgese recalled in a 1991 interview: " I told Hutchins that I 
thought if we got involved with the Law of the Sea Conference, 
we could try out our ideas and bring them down to the political 
arena and make them less utopian. That is why I got into the 
Law of the Sea." 14 
Borgese shrewdly took advantage of the opportunity to 
push for a new form of ocean regime at a time when ocean 
affairs were relatively high on the international agenda and 
also a fairly new field with no established cadre of intellectuals. 
She carved room for herself in the newly forming arena. It was 
a time in the development of the field of marine affairs that 
people with general backgrounds and general concerns for the 
ocean could become significant players. Prior to 1967, Borgese's 
interests had not included the ocean, the seabed or mineral 
mining. In 1975, Borgese wrote: 
"The ocean is a laboratory for the development of new 
and more rational methods of resource management...In 
the post-industrial era, ocean space may well become the 
fulcrum of a world economy, just as each semi-enclosed 
or enclosed ocean basin will be much more than in the 
past, the fulcrum of regional economic activities ... What 
Sandars, ed., The lnslilules of Justinian (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1922), p. 
90. 
14. Borgese interview, 1 Nov. 1991. 
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we are witnessing is a shift from a heartland-continent-
centered world view to an ocean- centered world 
view." 15 
This kind of broad, sweeping statement was typical of 
Borgese's writing. Many of her books and articles discuss a 
"Marine Revolution," that she compares to the industrial 
revolution. In the tone of a prophet she warns that this new 
revolution caused by advances in ocean technology should not 
proceed in the same way as the industrial revolution. Instead, 
man should design technological advancements that benefit a 
large portion of mankind and that do not leave damaged 
natural resources in the wake.16 Borgese adopts this same 
sweeping tone in other writings including, "The sea and the 
dreams of man," an essay published in 1978 in which she looks 
for the poetic essence of the ocean and links her own interests 
in ocean management to her father's ideas about the sea . 
... my father's love affair with the ocean must have 
influenced me powerfully. Rereading his works in my 
mature years, when I have myself become so deeply 
involved with the oceans, I find his analysis of the human 
relationship to nature, and especially the sea, the most 
profound I have come across. He recognized man's awe in 
face of the sea's infinity and wildness, in contrast to the 
constraints of civilization, both equally necessary and 
complementary; the sea as all and nothing, damnation 
and redemption, longing and fear; the sea as the dark and 
15. Elisabeth Mann Borgese, ed., The Tides of Change: Peace, Pollution and 
Potential of the Oceans (New York: Mason/Charger, 1975), p. 342. 
16. Elisabeth Mann Borgese, The Future of the Oceans: A Report to the Club of Rome 
(Montreal: Harvest House, 1986), p. 13-42. 
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wild element within the artist, within his characters and 
himself. 17 
Although much of her writing contained fanciful and 
poetic ideas, Borgese also proposed some concrete ideas for 
ocean management. Among them was the belief that the 
common heritage regime could provide an "urgently needed" 
system that was neither capitalism nor communism.18 She 
said the philosophy of "non-ownership" as described by Pardo 
was a key to this new system.19 Borgese also proposed that 
an ocean development tax be assessed by an international body 
on all fish caught, oil extracted and minerals produced from the 
ocean beyond national jurisdiction. Although her idea was 
proposed by the Canadian delegation in 1971 in the United 
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed, it died 
quickly .20 
Borgese, as a senior research fellow, and Pardo, as a 
visiting fellow, worked together at the Center for the Study of 
Democratic Institutions to define the con~ept of the common 
heritage of mankind in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Under 
their definition, the common heritage of mankind was a legal 
and philosophical concept.21 It was to be applied to ocean 
space, not just for seabed mining of manganese nodules, but 
also for mining of oil and gas, cooperation in scientific 
17. Jacques G. Richardson, ed., Managing the Ocean (Mt. Airy, MD: Lomond 
Publications, 1985), p. 393. 
18. Borgese, Future of the Oceans, p. 2. 
19. Ibid., p. 132. 
20. Ibid., p. 63-65. See also Canadian proposal of J.A. Beesley, In Elisabeth Mann 
Borgese, ed., Pacem in Maribus, vol. 2 (Malta: International Ocean Institute, 1971). 
21. Arvid Pardo, telephone interview with author, 2 December 1991. 
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exploration and environmental protection of the seabed and 
ocean waters above it. Under the concept, an international 
body would act as a trustee for mankind - present and future 
generations - to manage the ocean space. 
Together, Borgese and Pardo wrote The New 
International Economic Order And the Law of the Sea.22 In this 
1976 book they tried to tie the common heritage of mankind to 
the popular movement for a New International Economic Order 
led by Latin American and newly emerging African and Asian 
nations.23 The goal of the NIEO was for Africa, Asia and Latin 
America to move into positions of economic, political and 
technological power. The exact manner in which this could be 
done was vague. Those who promoted the NIEO embraced the 
common heritage of mankind as will be explained in greater 
detail in chapter four. They supported the common heritage 
idea because of the stated goal of sharing governance of a large 
area of the ocean, sharing technology needed to explore and 
mine the seabed and, finally, using profits made from selling 
the minerals for Third World development. In their book and 
in subsequent writings, Pardo and Borgese called the common 
heritage of mankind a broad and flexible concept. They said 
that the world was in a new era where "neither sovereignty 
22. Arvid Pardo and Elisabeth Mann Borgese, The New International Economic 
o ·rder And The Law of the Sea (Malta: International Ocean Institute, 1976), p. 4. 
23. United Nations, General Assembly, Res. 3281 (XXIX), 12 December 1974; U.N. 
Gen. Ass., Res. 3201 and 3202 (S-VI) 1 May 1974. 
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nor freedom (of the seas) are a suitable basis for a legal 
regime. "24 
Borgese often alluded to this world between two 
competing ideologies. For example, she believed ocean 
management could forge a new path between socialism and 
capitalism just as she believed it could establish a common 
space regime that was neither sovereignty nor freedom of the 
seas. The difficulty was figuring what is this in-between 
regime. In this area, Borgese's sweeping approach frustrated 
the practical-minded person. 
However, Borgese encouraged Pardo to articulate more 
clearly his idea and she also took on the role of publicizing 
Pardo's idea. For example, she noted in a 1991 interview that 
Pardo had deliberately used the word "heritage" instead of 
"property" when he first spoke of a concept for managing the 
ocean. He would later explain that he did not use the word 
"property" because he believed it carried implications of power 
and privilege.25 Borgese's earlier work with the Committee to 
Frame a World Constitution had promoted the idea of common 
property. But she said she preferred Pardo's idea that ocean 
space would not be owned, but would be governed for current 
and future generations. During the years that they worked 
together, Borgese adopted many of Pardo's ideas and 
influenced him by suggesting that the common heritage of 
24. Pardo and Borgese, The New International Economic Order, p. 4. 
25. Pardo interview, 2 Dec. 1991. 
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mankind concept should be a concept for other systems of 
government on land and sea, she told Pardo.26 
Over the decade from 1970 to 1980, Pardo's writing 
became increasingly pessimistic about what was happening to 
the common heritage concept. He began with optimism. In 
t 968, a year after his United Nations speech, Pardo published 
an article, "Who Will Control the Seabed?, "27 which strongly 
advocated that the common heritage include three major 
resources; hydrocarbons, calcareous ooze, which could be used 
to manufacture cement, and manganese nodules. He also 
predicted that ocean technology was proceeding so quickly that 
man would be able to live beneath the ocean in communities 
within the century. As with his speech, Pardo urged the 
creation of an international regime to manage, govern, exploit 
and explore the deep seabed. The article gave no specifics on 
where Pardo wished the international deep seabed to begin. 
One noticeable development in the article was that Pardo was 
more vocal about the concerns of lesser · developed countries 
than he had been in his 1967 speech. He wrote that the deep 
seabed should be mined for minerals in a way that did not 
seriously injure the economies of nations that produced the 
same minerals on land. Lesser developed countries were 
concerned that a seabed source of . minerals would flood 
markets and lower prices for their raw mineral exports. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Arvid Pardo, "Who Will Control the Seabed?" Foreign Affairs, vol. 47, no. 1 
(1968): p. 124. 
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Pardo's 1968 article was a rallying call for his suggested 
United Nations resolution on the common heritage of mankind -
the Dec. 17, 1970 "Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-
Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the 
· Limits of National Jurisdiction.28 The resolution declared the 
common heritage was "an area of the sea-bed and the ocean 
floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction, the precise limits of which are yet to be 
determined." It included all but one of the five initial points 
that Pardo made when he defined the common heritage regime 
in his 1967 speech. The resources of the common heritage were 
to be used for the benefit of all mankind, the deep seabed area 
was to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, the 
international regime would have jurisdiction; but no person or 
state would have sovereignty and the fruits of the deep seabed 
would be used to assist the developing nations. 
The resolution differed from Pardo's speech in that it 
pushed for international cooperation in ·scientific research, but 
did not stipulate that one nation's research in the deep seabed 
should be shared with other nation as Pardo had proposed. The 
resolution also advocated a "healthy development of the world 
economy" that would "minimize any adverse economic effects 
caused by the fluctuation of prices of raw materials .. " The 
resolution also included stipulations pushed by the American 
government and other maritime powers that nothing in the 
common heritage concept would affect the "legal status of the 
28. U.N., G.A., Res. 2749 (XXV), 17 December 1970. 
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waters superjacent to the area or that of the air space above 
those waters." The exploration and exploitation of the resources 
of the seabed would be governed by an "international regime 
to be established." Finally, the resolution called for the 
convening of a conference on the Law of the Sea. To prepare for 
such a conference, the United Nations created a Sea-bed 
Committee in 1968 to design an international regime. 
Before the Law of the Sea conference started in 1973, 
Pardo sounded his disappointment with the Sea-Bed Committee 
and his pessimism about the future of the common heritage. He 
became disappointed in the early 1970s as he saw that lesser 
developed countries were more interested in claiming large 
economic zones that extended their ocean jurisdiction than they 
were in setting up a large common heritage regime. As some of 
these lesser developed countries campaigned for 200-mile 
wide economic zones, they were advocating removal of the 
most valuable seabed resources - oil and gas - from what Pardo 
had hoped would be an international zone·. In an August 8, 
1973 speech, Pardo said he was disgusted with developing 
nation-sponsored proposals to expand coastal state sovereignty. 
In a sarcastic manner, he noted that: "There would still exist 
some marine plants, some floating seaweed, a few migratory 
species of fish and sea mammals and some manganese nodules 
outside the area under coastal State sovereignty of exclusive 
jurisdiction. "29 He went on to predict that the hunger by 
29 · Arvid Pardo, "A Statement on the Future Law of the Sea in Light of Current 
Trends in Negotiations," Ocean Development and International Law, vol. 1, no. 4 
(1974): p. 324. 
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coastal states for larger and larger jurisdiction over the ocean 
would result in a Law of the Sea conference slogan of "total 
irresponsibility within total sovereignty for the common 
benefit of mankind." 
Like Borgese, Pardo believed that the advance of ocean 
technology demanded a new legal concept for managing the 
ocean. In his view the concept of freedom of the seas would no 
longer work for the deep oceans; neither would the concept of 
sovereignty in which the remaining ocean space was carved up 
among nations. Instead, he called for a new way of thinking 
without outlining in concrete terms what it should be. "World 
federalists and academicians might believe the answer lies m 
the creation of a supranational authority for the oceans, to 
which States would surrender their powers," Pardo noted, but 
this was not "politically acceptable" nor "desirable." Instead, he 
advocated a "flexible institutional framework within which 
solutions can be sought to the increasingly serious problems 
which are arising in ocean space." He wanted to constrain both 
sovereignty and freedom and introduce a new element -
international cooperation.30 Pardo elaborated on the need for 
cooperation and sharing of information and technology in on 
July 26·, 1973 statement to the United Nations Social and 
Economic Council. 31 
By the time the United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea began in late 1973, Borgese and Pardo were on the 
30. Ibid., p. 330. 
31. Arvid Pardo, The Common Heritage: Selected Papers on Oceans and World 
Order, 1967-1974 (Malta: Malta University Press, 1975), p. 305-310. 
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periphery of the debate. Pardo lost his ambassadorship in 
1970 because of a change of government in Malta. Although he 
was named an advisor to the assistant secretary general of the 
United Nations, he felt powerless during the conference.32 His 
writing during this period from 1973 to the end of the 
conference in 1982 became increasingly bitter and pessimistic 
culminating with an article outlining the failure of the 
conference to give birth to a true and workable regime for the 
common heritage of mankind.33 
Borgese, on the other hand, remained an enthusiastic 
advocate of the common heritage regime. By the start of the 
conference, she had formed the International Ocean Institute, 
a privately-funded nongovernmental organization that put on 
international conferences, published papers on how the ocean 
should be governed and later ran training programs m ocean 
science and political issues for Third World leaders. She 
participated in the United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea as a nongovernmental representative until 1974. 
Frustrated with her position as a representative from an NGO, 
Borgese sought official diplomatic status. She wanted access to 
the closed sessions where much of the conference work was 
done. Borgese called on her international network of contacts to 
gain a seat as a national representative. Peter J ankowitsch of 
the Austrian delegation offered her a position on the delegation 
32. Pardo interview, 2 Dec. 1991. 
33. Arvid Pardo, "An Opportunity Lost," In B. H. Oxman, D.D. Caron and C.O. 
Buderi, eds., Law of the Sea: U.S. Policy Dilemma (San Francisco: Institute for 
Contemporary Studies, 1983), pp. 13-26. 
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of that nation.34 Using her status as a delegate, Borgese 
criticized negotiators for narrowly concentrating on an 
international regime for manganese-nodule mining. She urged 
the conference to consider all seabed resources especially oil 
and gas to be part of the common heritage.35 Despite 
appointment as a delegate, Borgese was not regarded as a 
powerful force at the conference. Policy-making was largely 
out of her hands. 3 6 
In addition to Borgese, a small group of Americans, 
members of church and other NGOs, took up the Law of the Sea 
as their cause. Like Borgese, these champions of the common 
heritage did not come from marine or scientific backgrounds. 
They were idealists, social reformers and dreamers. 
Sam and Miriam Levering had been advocates of what 
they called "world order" since the end of World War II. They 
heard about the United States Draft Proposal on the Law of the 
Sea in 1972 and were urged by fellow Quakers to lobby for the 
treaty within the United States government. · Said Miriam in a 
1991 correspondence: "We ended up volunteering to do this 
work, and stayed with it. We spent much time in Washington, 
New York, Geneva; formed two organizations, one for lobbying 
called The United States Committee for the Oceans and a year 
later, the Ocean Education Project. "3 7 
34. Borgese interview, 1 Nov. 1991. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Pardo interview, 2 Dec. 1991 and Marne Dubs, personal interview with author, 
Narragansett, RI, 23 July 1991. 
37. Miriam Levering, correspondence with author, 4 October 1991. 
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The Leverings joined with the United Methodist Women's 
group to publish a newsletter called Neptune during the 
conference. Miriam said: "We were motivated by our religious 
convictions that society at any level rests on the three Biblical 
principles of law, justice and love. As communication has made 
the world a community, it became clear that no community can 
exist without some rules to prevent and settle conflict. Our 
interest in the environmental aspects of the convention came 
from a religious belief in the integrity of Creation." 
The Leverings pushed for a large area of the ocean to be 
considered the common heritage of mankind. At the start of 
the conference, there was discussion about including all the sea 
floor beyond the three mile territorial sea in the common 
heritage. But this idea quickly disappeared as coastal nations 
latched onto the idea of creating 200-mile wide exclusive 
economic zones off their coasts. The exclusive economic zone 
was negotiated at the conference and allowed for each coastal 
nation to declare the resources in a 200-mile band of ocean to 
be theirs to manage and exploit.3 8 
The Quaker United Nations staff m Geneva also 
participated in the Law of the Sea discussions by offering 
weekly ·panel discussions at the conference sessions in Geneva. 
The discussions brought together delegates, scholars, scientists 
38. David J. Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987). See also Francisco Vicuna, ed., The Exclusive Economic 
Zone: A Latin American Perspective (Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 1984). 
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government officials and members of nongovernmental 
organizations.39 
Barbara Weaver, another citizen advocate of the common 
heritage, was teaching social studies in a junior high school in 
Ohio when she developed an interest in the Law of the Sea. She 
took her class on a field trip to the United Nations in 197 4 and 
the students met with diplomats about to depart for the 
conference session in Caracas. Weaver was impressed by the 
excitement of diplomats preparing for a conference that 
brought together more nations of the world than had ever met. 
When she returned to Ohio, she decided to get more involved 
with the Law of the Sea and took an internship with the 
Women's Division of the General Board of Global Ministries of 
the United Methodist Church. 
The Law of the Sea brought together a number of 
Weaver's concerns - the ocean, social justice, peace and hunger 
issues. In 1976, the Methodists founded a Law of the Sea 
Project and hired Weaver to work full-time· on it in 
Washington. The Methodist Church became interested m the 
issue because it fostered cooperation among nations in a 
peaceful forum and because the church believed that ocean 
wealth ·from mineral mining might finance a more just type of 
development in the Third World. Weaver joined with the 
Leverings to publish Neptune during the various sessions of 
the conference. The small NGOs also hosted speakers at forums 
39. Lawrence Juda, ed., The Seventh Session of the Third United Nations Conference 
on The Law of the Sea: Summary of Remarks of the Speakers, 11 April to 9 May 
1978. 
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to help build an awareness among delegates and interested 
public of various issues discussed in treaty negotiations. 
Weaver helped publish a 100-page handbook that was used to 
explain the Law of the Sea issues to church groups in America's 
heartland. 40 
"I have always felt that the idea of the common heritage 
is an important one," Weaver said in 1991. "Not only is there a 
benefit to holding resources in common, but also the idea of 
holding resources for the future was exciting. But the 
mechanics of figuring out how to do this ground people 
down. "41 
As advocates for the common heritage, Weaver and the 
Leverings knew they were fighting a difficult battle. There was 
strong tension between their idealism and the realism of the 
American diplomats who reluctantly endorsed the idea of an 
international regime for the deep seabed. 
"I really thought the deep seabed was a small part of the 
world. I really thought the industrialized · nations would let that 
piece go to benefit the poorest of the poor nations," Weaver 
said. "But they were concerned about precedent. In the end, I 
think it was too radical an idea." Weaver left the Law of the Sea 
Project in 1981. The Methodist Church closed the project in 
1984. 
40. Barbara Weaver, Lee Kimball, Miriam Levering, Arthur Paterson, James 
Bridgman, Barbara Bachtell and Sister Mary Beth Reissen, Voyage to Discovery 
(1977), an unpublished loose-leaf manual used to explain the Law of the Sea to 
church and community groups. 
41. Barbara Weaver, personal interview with author, New York City, 20 September 
1991. 
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"There was a brief window of possibility of real 
cooperation," Weaver said. But that moment passed quickly. 
Weaver places that moment in 1974 in Caracas. "That was 
when people talked seriously about the common heritage of 
mankind. Then the roadblocks got thrown up, awful fast," she 
said. 
John Logue waged his own campaign for the common 
heritage of mankind, as director of Villanova University's 
World Order Research Institute and as a member of the World 
Federalists. In 1980, Logue renamed the institute he directed, 
the Common Heritage Institute. Like Borgese, with whom he 
worked, Logue maintained that the idea of the common 
heritage was larger than the oceans and should apply to other 
natural resources in the future. He argued that the ocean's 
mineral wealth could provide a substantial financial base to 
assist Third World development, alleviate world hunger, fund 
ocean environmental protection and give the United Nations its 
first independent source of income. In newsletters, speeches 
and the introduction to a book he edited, entitled,The Fate of 
the Oceans, Logue said that the major problem with the United 
Nations was its lack of a reliable source of revenue to do 
international work. Logue suggested that revenue from mining 
oil and gas and seabed minerals should provide that source. 
"Long ago, in The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton said that 
a person does not truly will an end or objective unless he also 
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wills the means to accomplish that objective," wrote Logue in 
Fate of the Oceans.42 
Throughout the nearly nine year Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, Logue published a newsletter, the World Order 
Research Institute Report, which detailed conference 
happenings and promoted ideas he supported. Like others on 
the nongovernment side of the aisle, Logue was a maximalist. 
To him, the common heritage was a philosophical concept 
endorsing the benevolent management of ocean space by an 
international regime for current and future generations. Logue 
fought against the 200-mile exclusive economic zone, 
maintaining that it took a sizeable chunk out of the most 
valuable land and resources from the common heritage. "The 
200 mile EEZ means the death of the common heritage," Logue 
wrote. 43 Logue was more interested in the original draft treaty 
proposed by President Nixon in 1970 which would have 
created an International Seabed Area beyond the 200-meter-
isobath.44 This area would have two parts·. Ocean areas 
between the 200 meter isobath and the edge of the continental 
margin would be in the International Trusteeship Area. This 
area would be managed by the coastal nation, which would 
share r'evenues from resources with an international body. The 
42. John Logue, ed., The Fate of the Oceans (Villanova: Villanova University Press, 
1972), p. xvii. 
43. World Order Research Institute, World Order Research Institute Report (July 
1975), pp. 1-4. 
44. For copy of U.S. Draft Convention on the International Seabed Area see 
appendix of Lawrence Juda, Ocean Space Rights: Developing U.S. Policy (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 205-249. 
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deep sea beyond this zone would be completely managed by an 
international ocean regime. 
Logue promoted what was called the Barba Negra 
Formula, named for a tall ship that he, other NG Os and 
diplomats, sailed in New York harbor to promote the common 
heritage concept. Similar to the Nixon proposal in concept, the 
formula called for an even larger area where ocean wealth 
would be shared between nations and the international 
community. It proposed the sharing of revenues from mineral 
mining and oil production in the portion of ocean space from a 
12-mile territorial sea to the end of the 200-mile exclusive 
economic zone. Logue used his newsletter to promote this 
formula and later to advocate a proposal by Nepal Ambassador 
Shailendra K. Upadhyay to create a Common Heritage Fund 
based on a similar revenue-sharing scheme.45 
Logue also used his newsletter to prod Third World 
leaders to take a strong role in promoting the common heritage. 
"Unless the Third World takes a major responsibility for 
reviving the common heritage of mankind there is every 
reason to believe that the concept and the bright promise 
inherent in it will die," Logue wrote as early as 1975.46 
Ii is difficult to assess the effect these fledgling 
nongovernmental organizations had on the development of the 
common heritage of mankind concept. They promoted 
45. World Order Research Institute, World Order Research Institute Report (March 
1978), p. 1. 
46. World Order Research Institute, World Order Research Institute Report 
(February 1975), p. I. 
58 
discussion of the idea even when delegates were inclined to 
ignore the concept or bog it down with technical disputes. 
Borgese tried to broaden the constituency for the common 
heritage concept by inviting international thinkers to annual 
conferences. Although these conferences were sometimes 
criticized as glorified international cocktail parties, they did 
produce a body of writing that spread the philosophy and the 
rhetoric of the common heritage. These conferences also 
connected the ocean with other global issues such as 
disarmament, population issues, pollution and hunger.4 7 
The small membership of the NGOs did not seem to deter 
them from sponsoring numerous forums and producing 
volumes of written material during and after the conference. 
Logue, Borgese and the Leverings each sponsored forums in 
which diplomats, Third World leaders, scientists and 
economists spoke on ocean issues. They realized that the 
common heritage idea had few strong spokesmen among the 
United States delegation. Usually, their strongest allies were 
among delegates from Africa and Asia. Logue and Borgese also 
lamented that the delegates did not engage in much discussion 
of what the common heritage of mankind would mean, leaving 
this typ.e of discussion to NGO forums.48 
One of the political weaknesse.s of common heritage 
advocates was that they spoke for handfuls of like-minded 
47 · Elisabeth Mann Borgese, ed., Pacem in Maribus (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 
1972). 
48. Borgese interview, 1 Nov. 1991. See also World Order Research Institute, World 
Order Research Institute Report (October 1974), p. 1. 
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people not large grass-root organizations. There was no 
groundswell of support for the common heritage of mankind in 
the American heartland. Borgese was a one-person-show m 
many ways although she had an extensive network of 
international scholars and diplomats to draw on for Pacem m 
Maribus conferences. She was well-connected internationally 
because of her work with Hutchins and her celebrity as the 
daughter of an internationally known writer. Borgese also had 
other international ties because she was a member of the Club 
of Rome, an informal organization of scientists, educators, 
economists and industrialists founded in 1968 to promote 
global policy. 4 9 
The common heritage advocates also lacked 
nongovernmental counterparts from the lesser developed 
countries in Africa, Latin America or Asia. The reason may be 
that people in these countries did not have the money, time or 
see the direct relevance to their lives of rallying for the 
common heritage of mankind. The concept was abstract and it 
was difficult for most people to make the connection between a 
seabed regime and solving world problems of poverty, hunger 
and underdevelopment. The people that rallied to this idea 
were intellectuals, social justice activists and government 
representatives from the Third World who could make the 
abstract connection, had a deep belief in international 
cooperation or saw an advantage to supporting the idea. But 
49. See Donella Meadows, Dennis Meadows et al., The Limits of Growth: A Report for 
the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind (New York: Universe 
Books, 1972). 
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because the NGOs had no counterparts from the Third World, 
they can be compared to abolitionists of the 19th century -
certain they knew what was right for a part of the world with 
which they were not intimately familiar. As with the 
abolitionists, these "do-gooders" were not always understood or 
respected even by the people they claimed to be supporting. 
But the small band of NGOs did raise a strong voice for 
internationalism and a global perspective at a conference 
where nationalistic concerns dominated.50 At the close of the 
Law of the Sea conference, Ambassador Tommy T. B. Koh of 
Singapore, the conference president, thanked the Neptune 
Group in particular for providing the conference with three 
services - bringing independent sources of information on 
technical issues, assisting representatives from developing 
countries understand the new technology that prompted talk of 
seabed mining and providing places for delegates to meet and 
discuss ideas.5 1 
The NGOs also began efforts to broaden the constituency 
for the oceans. Despite its mammoth size - covering more than 
70 percent of the earth - the ocean, especially the area not 
connected to the coast, does not have a strong and large 
constituency. The NGOs at the conference were the beginnings 
of a citizen constituency for the ocean which has grown in the 
1980s and 1990s with the help of charismatic international 
50. J .N Barnes, "Non-governmental organizations: Increasing Global Perspective," 
Marine Policy, vol. 8 (1984): p. 171-81. 
51. Manin I. Glassner, Neptune's Domain: A Political Geography of the Sea (Boston: 
Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 132. 
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organizations such as Greenpeace and also mor·e specific causes 
than a common heritage regime to rally around such as the 
extinction of whales.5 2 
52. Anthony D'Amato and Sudhir K. Chopra, "Whales: Their Emerging Right to 
Life, "American Journal of International Law, vol. 85 (1991): p. 21-62. 
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Chapter III - The Marriage of the New International 
Economic Order and the Common Heritage of Mankind 
While leaders of some NGOs were devoted advocates of 
the concept of the common heritage of mankind, the most 
powerful promoters of the common heritage at the United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea were delegates from 
the newly independent nations of the developing world. These 
delegates from African, Asian and Latin American nations were 
powerful for two reasons. They had the majority of votes 
because there were more developing countries than 
industrialized nations. They also had a moral argument; their 
years of colonial subjugation allowed them to appeal to the 
guilt of the industrialized world. Unlike many of the 
industrialized nations and some of the socialist countries that 
reacted to Pardo's proposal with suspicion and reservation, 
these nations embraced the concept and adopted it as a piece of 
a larger movement called the New International Economic 
Order.I 
These national leaders defined the common heritage of 
mankind so that it would fit with the broader New 
International Economic Order goals of restructuring the 
international economy. The NIEO was announced and defined 
in several United Nations resolutions including one passed on 
L Lawrence Juda, ed., The Seventh Session of the Third United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea: Summary of Remarks of the Speakers, Quaker United Nations 
Office Report, 11 April - 9 May 1978. 
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12 1974 called the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties.2 Dec. ' 
A desire for a New International Economic Order was also 
articulated at the UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). The growing number of developing nations 
established this organization in 1964 because they wanted to 
have more than a majority of the votes in the United Nations. 
They desired some power over international trade.3 
Forces favoring what became known as the NIEO had 
been gaining momentum since the end of colonial rule in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. By the late 1960s, these 
countries had begun to challenge the classic economic system 
that dominated the global economy. The new nations believed 
they had obtained political freedom, but were not economically 
free of their colonial masters. They saw the laissez-faire 
economic system as promoting a form of neo-colonialism in 
which Third World countries continued to supply the 
developed world with raw materials, while being forced to pay 
high prices for finished products.4 As these nations watched 
their international debt grow, they saw the gap between the 
wealthy, industrialized nations and their countries widening. 
The goals of the New International Economic Order were 
to restructure the economic system in the areas of trade, 
2. U.N., G.A., Res. 3281 (XXIX) 12 December 1974. See also U.N., G.A., Res. 3201 (S-
VI) 1 May 1974. 
3. P.N. Agarwala, The New International Economic Order: An Overview (New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1983), pp. 112 and 167. See also Edwin Reubens, ed., The 
Challenge of the New International Economic Order (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1981). 
4. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ed., The New International Economic Order: The North-
South Debate (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1977), p. 4. 
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finance, technology transfers, and political relationships as a 
way to close the wealth gap between developing countries and 
the developed world. The Declaration of the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order notes that "the developing 
countries, which constitute 70 percent of the world population, 
account for only 30 percent of the world's income."5 The 
developing countries believed the common heritage of mankind 
could help them close the gap. 
An international ocean regime for a vast portion of the 
globe could be designed to give the lesser developed countries 
a stronger role to play than they had in any other international 
organization, including the United Nations which was formed 
before these countries were born. The mining of a new 
resource could produce profits to assist development projects 
in the Third World. The common heritage of mankind also 
offered a chance to create new international law .6 They 
hoped it would be a "law of cooperation" among nations.7 They 
wanted it to be a departure from existing international law 
. . 
which these nations perceived as designed to protect private 
interests working abroad and they wanted it to address human 
welfare issues.8 
5. U.N., G.A., Res. 3201. 
6. Milan Bulajic, Principles of International Development Law (Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1986). 
7 · Boleslaw Adam Boczek, "Ideology and the Law of the Sea: The Challenge of the 
New International Economic Order, Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review, vol. vii, no. 1 (1984): p. 5. 
8. Lawrence Juda, "UNCLOS III and the New International Economic Order," Ocean 
Development and International Law Journal, vol. 7, no. 3-4, (1979): p. 223. 
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Leaders of the newly emerging nations also recognized 
that the common heritage concept was evolving, and that they 
would have a chance to put their imprint on it. Arvid Pardo 
and Elizabeth Mann Borgese encouraged leaders of lesser 
developed nations that the concept was well-suited to the New 
International Economic Order .9 
Scholars and leaders of developing countries defined the 
common heritage as a new concept in international law, a 
departure from all that had come before. This stand was bound 
to make western nations that were more comfortable with 
incremental change uneasy. For example, Shigeru Oda, the 
Japanese delegate to the United Nations Sea-bed Committee, 
the body established by the United Nations in 1968 to study 
ways to create a seabed regime, wanted to be sure that the 
common heritage concept did not supplant the age-old 
international legal concept of freedom of the high seas.Io In a 
statement on March 25, 1969 in the Sea-bed Committee, Oda 
said: "To ignore that principle will inevitably result in chaos 
and thus inhibit the optimum use of the seabed for the benefit 
of all mankind." 11 
9. Elisabe_th Mann Borgese, "The New International Economic Order and · the Law of 
the Sea," San Diego Law Review, vol. 14, no. 3 (1977): p. 548. See also Arvid Pardo, 
"Building the New International Order: The Need for a Framework Treaty," In A. 
Dolman, ed., Global Planning and Resource Management (New York: Pergamon Press, 
1980) pp. 195-201. 
10. Under the principle of freedom of the seas no state may subject any part of the 
high seas to its sovereignty. This principle was customary law in the 18th century 
and became part of treaty law in Article I of the 1958 United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea, Convention on the High Seas, 29 April 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312. 
11. Shigeru Oda, ed., The Law of the Sea in our Time: The United Nations Sea-bed 
Committee, 1968-1973 (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1977), p. 57. 
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To the developing countries, the principle of freedom of 
the seas was part of the old order. It was an ocean law 
equivalent of laissez-faire economics that allowed the powerful 
to take a larger share of fish, oil and other ocean resources than 
that taken by the lesser developed nations. It did nothing to 
ensure equal access to natural resources. The debate became 
whether the principle of freedom of the seas would be replaced 
by the emerging principle of the common heritage in the deep 
seabed or whether the two could exist at once. 
The developing country definition of the common 
heritage of mankind differed from Pardo's original definition in 
considering the deep seabed a type of "common property" that 
would by owned by "mankind." Christopher Pinto of Sri Lanka 
explained to participants at a 1978 Law of the Sea Workshop at 
the University of Hawaii that the common heritage of mankind 
" ... means that those minerals cannot be freely mined. 
They are not there, so to speak, for the taking." I 2 
The idea that the seabed 1s the exclusive property of 
Mankind is expressed in the Moratorium Resolution passed m 
1969 by the United Nations General Assembly prohibiting 
exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed by any nation 
12. Said Mahmoudi, The Law of Deep Sea-Bed Mining (Stockholm: Almqvist & 
Wiksell International, 1987), p. 159. See also Christopher Pinto, "Toward a Regime 
Governing International Public Property," In A. Dolman, ed., Global Planning and 
Resource Management (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 202-224. 
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pending the establishment of an international regime.13 The 
resolution was passed over the objections of a number of 
developed countries including the United States, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. It states that 
"pending the establishment of the aforementioned international 
regime: a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound 
to refrain from all activities of exploitation of the resources of 
the area of the sea-bed ... beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction." 14 
A representative from the United States to the United 
Nations called the resolution counterproductive, unnecessary 
and charged that it was ludicrous for the Third World to 
believe a great seabed land grab was about to happen. The U.S. 
also said such a moratorium resolution set a discouraging tone 
for commercial development of mining technology at a time 
when private industry needed encouragement. The United 
States accused promoters of the resolution with trying to slow 
seabed exploration and exploitation technology and claimed 
that such a resolution encouraged nations to make 
"unjustifiably expansive" ocean space claims in order to remove 
more territory from a future international regime. I 5 
The moratorium was promoted by Garcia Robles, the 
representative from Mexico to the United Nations, who called it 
13. U.N., G.A., Res. 2574D (XXIV) 15 December 1969. Reprinted in Shigeru Oda, 
ed., The International Law of the Ocean Development: Basic Documents (Leyden: 
Sijthoff, 1972), p. 43. 
14. Ibid. 
15. U.N., G.A. (A/PV.1833), 15 December 1969. 
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simply a repetition of what had already been stated in 
previous resolutions. Robles said the moratorium was needed 
to protect the seabed from people taking advantage of the legal 
vacuum until the regime was developed. Araujo Castro, the 
United Nation delegate from Brazil, also said it was logical to 
postpone any seabed activities.16 The resolution was adopted 
by a vote of 62 to 28, with 28 abstentions. 
Developing countries trumpeted the common heritage of 
mankind regime while they also took up the cause of extending 
national jurisdiction in the ocean. By supporting both a highly 
international concept and a nationalistic concept of extending 
jurisdiction, the developing countries were ideologically 
conflicted.17 What they truly wanted was to control more of 
the world's resources and they looked for the most expedient 
ways to achieve this control. 
By promoting 200-mile-wide exclusive economic zones, 
some of the coastal Latin American and African delegates to 
the conference differed markedly from Pard·o and NGO 
advocates of the common heritage. This zone would be claimed 
by the coastal state for exclusive fishing, mining and other 
resource use. The idea had emerged from Africa and Latin 
America. In June 1972, the African States Regional Se~inar on 
the Law of the Sea in Yaounde endorsed a 200-mile economic 
zone.18 During the same month, a group of Latin American 
16. Ibid. 
17. Boczek, Ideology and the Law of the Sea. 
18. Reprinted in U.N., G.A., Official Records, Supplement 21, (A/8721), 1972, p. 
70. 
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nations issued the Declaration of Santo Domingo which called 
for a patrimonial sea to give states sovereign rights over a 
large new ocean territory yet to be demarcated.1 9 
The idea of the exclusive economic zone conflicted with 
Pardo's hopes that nations would move beyond sovereignty as 
a primary goal and create a large common heritage area with 
oil and mineral resources. However, the zone fulfilled one of 
the stated New International Economic Order goals of 
nationalizing natural resources. By pushing for nationalized 
ocean space, the lesser developed countries with coastlines 
would be securing these resources for themselves at a time 
when entrepreneurs from developed countries wanted to drill 
for oil or fish off the coasts of countries with abundant 
resources. The Latin American nations led by Peru, Chile and 
Brazil were the strongest proponents of expanding a nation's 
ocean claims. But many African coastal states also saw this as a 
positive move. The lesser developed countries without coasts 
and with limited or no continental shelves did not favor 
extending ocean jurisdiction.20 However, these nations joined 
with other developing countries to support the idea of 
extending jurisdiction because they did not want to side with 
developed countries that opposed the ocean enclosure 
movement. 21 
19. Ibid. p. 73. 
20. R.P. Anand, Legal Regime of The Sea-Bed And The Developing Countries (Delhi: 
Thomson Press Ltd., 1975), p. 159. 
21. Boczek, Ideology and the Law of the Sea, p. 13-15. 
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Boleslaw Boczek has concluded that the "rhetoric of the 
NIEO" was used to mask pure and simple "nationalism." By 
promoting the exclusive economic zone, these nations were 
urging the removal of one third of ocean space from what 
would be the common heritage of mankind. In addition, that 
third of ocean space contained most of the valuable oil and gas 
deposits and nearly 80 percent of the fish stocks. In the end, 
the adoption of the exclusive economic zone benefited 
developed countries more than its Third World promoters. 
Twenty five countries control 76 percent of the world exclusive 
economic zone.22 The United States and France lead the world 
in square miles of exclusive economic zone.23 
The primary conflict between the NIEO and the common 
heritage of mankind regime for the ocean was economic. Some 
of the founders of the NIEO were representatives of African 
and Latin American nations that had mineral mines within 
their land borders. When they talked about nationalizing 
natural resources they were speaking primarily about 
controlling these mines and the wealth that came from them. 
They also talked about forming cartels in order to gain more 
economic power in international trade.24 They looked to the 
Arab Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' embargo 
22. Ibid., p. 14. 
23. Lewis Alexander, Navigational Restrictions Within the New LOS Context: 
Geographical Implications for the United States (Peacedale, RI: Offshore 
Consultants Inc., 1986), p. 88. 
24. Kenneth E. Boulder, "Cartels, Prices, and the Grants Economy," In Edwin 
Reubens, ed., The Challenge of the New International Economic Order (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1981). 
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as a role model for building an economic power base and 
controlling prices. The problem was how could these nations 
support an international regime devoted to increasing 
exploitation of minerals from the seabed. It was obvious that 
these minerals would compete on the world market with the 
minerals mined within some of the developing countries. The 
competition might depress prices or even shift the mining 
business permanently from land to sea.25 
How could the developing countries resolve the major 
conflicts between devotion to a common heritage regime for 
mining the seabed and a desire to limit or, at least, control the 
supply and prices of a new source of minerals on the world 
market? How could these nations resolve their desire to 
promote a new form of internationalism and at the same time 
grab as much ocean space as was possible for their particular 
nations? These conflicts would become more apparent during 
the ten years of negotiations on a Law of the Sea Treaty. They 
would be accommodated in the treaty. But the accommodation 
would add a level of complexity to the treaty which would 
make parts of it completely impractical. 
25. United Nations, Report by the Secretariat of the United Nations Conference on 
T.rade and Development, Implications of the Exploitation of the Mineral Resources 
of the International Area of the Sea-Bed: Issues of International Commodity Policy, 
(TD/B/C. l/170), 8 January 1975. 
72 
Chapter IV - The Concept is Translated into Policy 
The intellectual idea of applying the common heritage 
concept to the world's oceans moved into the policy arena at 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) in 1973. As with any intellectual concept, the 
journey transformed the lofty idea into a much different 
practical policy. A whole new set of people dominated the 
policy-making arena than had been part of the idea arena. 
Although some of the idea people, including Borgese and Pardo, 
continued to write, participate in discussions and closely 
observe UNCLOS, they had little effect on the treaty-making 
process. 
This chapter describes the aspirations of developing 
nations for a common heritage policy and the aspirations of the 
United States, the leading developed nation and originally one 
of the strongest proponents of a Law of the Sea Conference, for 
a seabed mining regime. The developing nations and the United 
States were caught in a stru.ggle over translating the idea into a 
workable mining regime. Some of the key points in this 
struggle included a 1976 compromise put forward by Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger; the work of Elliot Richardson, 
President Jimmy Carter's negotiator at UNCLOS; the role of the 
American Congress in influencing the international agreement 
and President Reagan's 1982 decision to reject the seabed 
regime. This chapter will review the current status of the 
seabed portion of the treaty, the preparatory commission 
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meetings and current and future economic viability of seabed 
mining. 
The geographic limitations of the common heritage 
regime were defined quickly at UNCLOS. Borgese had suggested 
an international ocean regime that governed ocean space - the 
waters and the seabed - beyond the territorial sea, but 
negotiations limited the common heritage to the deep seabed 
and subsoil. The waters above would continue to be governed 
by the concept of freedom of the high seas. Early in the 
conference, nations demanded a 200-mile exclusive economic 
zone and coastal state rights to exploit the living and nonliving 
resources of this band of ocean space as well as the continental 
shelf beyond 200 miles.I When nations agreed to this, they 
eliminated the chance that off shore oil - found predominantly 
beneath the continental shelf - would be part of the common 
heritage. Pardo lamented the loss of this valuable resource to 
the world community and warned that it stripped the common 
heritage of its value and doomed the regime to insignificance.2 
By the start of UNCLOS, the world's nations had agreed 
that the deep seabed and its resources were the common 
heritage of mankind, a shared resource. This step was 
accomplished in the 1970 Declaration of Principles passed as a 
1. Bernard H. Oxman, "Summary of the Law of the Sea Convention," In Oxman, D. 
Caron and C. Buderi, eds., Law of the Sea: U.S. Policy Dilemma (San Francisco: 
I~stitute for Contemporary Studies, 1983), p. 153. 
2. Arvid Pardo, The Common Heritage: Selected Papers on Oceans and World Order 
1967-1974 (Malta: Malta University Press, 1975), p. xii. 
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United Nations General Assembly resolution.3 But it was a 
much more difficult step for nations with highly different 
economic systems and political ideologies to design an 
international economic organization to oversee the extraction of 
minerals from the seabed and the division of revenues. 
The United Nations conference, a body of more than 
3,000 delegates from 159 nations, the largest legislative forum 
ever convened, assigned the duty of drafting a seabed regime 
to Committee One. Committee Two worked on issues of 
national jurisdiction, economic zones, territorial sea, straits and 
continental shelves, while Committee Three addressed marine 
pollution, scientific research issues and technology transfer. 
The Law of the Sea convention attempted to tackle all the 
significant ocean issues that had emerged to write a 
"constitution for the oceans. "4 
The conference was held primarily because the United 
States and other maritime powers were concerned with 
"creeping jurisdiction," the phrase used to describe a trend m 
which coastal states push their jurisdiction seawards, causing 
navigational and overflight barriers to maritime powers. The 
United States began pushing for a Law of the Sea conference in 
the late 1960s.5 In addition, the developed countries wanted 
to address concerns about dwindling fisheries, the marine 
environment, and oil exploration. Initially, American policy-
3. U.N., G.A., Res. 2749 (XXV), 17 December 1970. 
4~ William Wertenbaker, "A Reporter at Large: The Law of the Sea," New Yorker 
(Aug. 1, 1983): p. 39. 
5 · Elliot Richardson, telephone interview with author, 7 May 1992. 
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makers believed separate treaties on these diverse issues 
would be the best approach. However, they realized these 
narrowly-focused treaties would not interest and therefore 
discourage participation by a large number of the new, 
predominantly Third World nations. So they considered adding 
issues that interested the new nations, including the common 
heritage regime for seabed mining and revenues from it. In 
1969, the United Nations announced the conference would take 
up a broad array of issues and aim for a "package deal." 6 
By the start of the conference, delegations of a number 
of developing countries that served on the UN Sea-bed 
Committee had drafted proposals for a seabed regime. These 
proposals reflected a desire for mineral price supports, 
transfers of technology from the industrialized countries to the 
developing nations, aid from developed countries to build 
oceanographic institutions, processing plants in developing 
countries and hiring preferences for people from developing 
countries. The Tanzanian draft, submitted · to the Sea-bed 
Committee on March 24, 1971, suggested the treaty provide for 
"equitable sharing by States ... taking into particular 
consideration the interests and needs of developing countries, 
whether landlocked or coastal. "7 The second aim was that the 
authority would minimize fluctuations of prices of land 
minerals and raw materials taken from the seabed. Tanzania 
6. Elliot Richardson, "Law of the Sea: A Reassessment of U.S. Interests," 
Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 2 (1990): p. 9. 
7. Text of Tanzanian Draft can be found in Shigeru Oda, ed., The International Law 
of the Ocean Development: Basic Documents (Leyden; Sijthoff, 1972), p. 114. 
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also wanted an International Seabed Authority to be 
empowered to explore and exploit the resources itself. The 
seabed authority would be in charge of mining and would 
oversee any subcontracting of the mining to private or national 
companies. 8 Tanzania also stressed that there should be formal 
exchanges of scientific and technical information as well as 
exchanges of scientists to assist with training. 
Tanzania suggested the governance of the seabed be left 
to an assembly and council. The assembly would include every 
nation that was party to the treaty and each nation would have 
one vote; the council would consist of 18 members elected by 
the assembly, not less than three delegates from landlocked 
states. The representatives must be from different areas of the 
world to assure a geographic distribution. The council could be 
controlled by the lesser developed countries because they 
would control the assembly which elected the council. 
Fourteen Latin American nations also submitted a 
proposal to the Sea-bed Committee in the summer of 197 I.9 
Like the Tanzanian proposal, it emphasized that the seabed 
should be exploited in a manner that minimized any fluctuation 
of prices for land-produced mineral exports. More specifically, 
it said · the International Seabed Authority would have the 
power to control, reduce, suspend production or "fix" prices of 
minerals mined from the seabed. The Latin American proposal 
gave broad powers to the International Seabed Authority to 
8~ Ibid., p. 117. 
9. Text of Latin American Draft can be found in Oda, ed., The International Law of 
Ocean Development: Basic Documents, p. 143. 
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supervise all stages of scientific research in the common 
heritage area. The ISA would ensure "the participation of 
developing countries on terms of equality with developed 
countries in all aspects of the activities carried out in the 
area." 1 o Among these broad powers was the right of the 
authority to favor developing countries when siting processing 
plants and to "adopt appropriate measures to ensure the 
employment of qualified personnel from developing countries 
in all aspects of the activities carried out in the area." These 
were the affirmative action stipulations. 
Some developing countries feared seabed mining would 
create a bonanza of minerals that might depress prices of their 
mineral exports. These fears, which proved unrealistic because 
seabed mining never developed, were based on the original 
estimated total volume of manganese nodules - some 1.5 
trillion tons. However, the figure ignored market forces that 
would control production and the high cost of obtaining even a 
small fraction of these seabed minerals. I 1 · 
The initial U.S. plan, called the Nixon proposal, for a 
seabed regime began with the statement that the seabed 
should be considered the common heritage of mankind.12 
Article · 5 of the proposal stated that an International Seabed 
Authority shall use revenues from exploration and exploitation 
of the mineral resources "for the benefit all mankind, 
particularly to promote the economic advancement of 
10. Ibid., p. 144. 
11. Richardson, Law of the Sea, p. 5. 
12. Text of U.S. Proposal can be found in Juda, Ocean Space Rights, p. 205. 
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developing States Parties to this Convention .. " 13 In this sense, 
Americans accepted the concept of the common heritage and 
Pardo's priorities without changes. According to Markus 
Schmidt, Elliot Richardson, the Under Secretary of State for 
President Richard M. Nixon, and David Packard, the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, designed the American draf t.14 During 
the 1970s, Richardson took other positions in the Nixon 
Administration, including Attorney General. He returned to the 
Law of the Sea process in 1977 as an appointee of another 
president, Jimmy Carter. 
The American proposal submitted to the UN Sea-bed 
Committee in 1970 was explicit on geography and specific on 
economic and business concerns. The International Seabed 
Area was to begin just beyond the depth of 200 meters in the 
ocean. If the 200-meter isobath was on the continental shelf, 
there would be a new area called the trusteeship zone between 
the 200-meter isobath and the end of the continental margm. 
The coastal state would manage the trusteeship zone, but 
would hold the zone in trust for the international community 
and would share revenues from resources with the 
international community. The international community would 
manage and reap the benefits of seabed resources beyond the 
trusteeship zone. The draft proposed an assembly, council and 
tribunal to govern the international seabed area. The council 
would have representatives of six of the most industrially-
13. Ibid. 
14. Markus Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden? (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989), p. 26. 
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advanced nations that were engaged in seabed mining. The 
proposed council would also include 18 additional 
representatives, 12 would be from developing countries and at 
least two must represent land-locked or shelf-locked nations.15 
The council was to draw up budgets and submit these for 
approval to the assembly. A tribunal would be created to 
resolve disputes, including disagreements over claims to ocean 
mining sites. 
The proposed treaty included protection for mining 
companies that had already begun exploration and exploitation 
when the treaty was enacted. This was a concern of the newly 
developing American mineral-mining industry.16 The treaty 
called for payments to the International Seabed Authority to 
be based on production and for there to be a rental fee for the 
seabed mining sites. This was similar to the American system 
of leasing outer continental shelf lands for oil and gas 
exploitation. The sites would be awarded to various exploiters 
using cash bonus bids, another similarity to the American oil 
and gas leasing program run by the Interior Department. The 
proposal, with its division of responsibilities for the trusteeship 
zones and the international seabed area, had familiar themes of 
balance· of power found in the United States Constitution. In 
this case, the draft treaty was balancing the rights of the 
15. These are the countries that because of their geography have no access to a 
continental shelf and therefore the resources of these rich oceanic areas. 
l~. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Report of 
Congressional Research Service on Deep Seabed Minerals: Resources, Diplomacy 
and Strategic Interest, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1 March 1978, p. 87. 
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international government which was analogous to the federal 
government with the rights of the various coastal national 
governments which were analogous to the state governments. 
The national governments would have a version of "state's 
rights" in the trusteeship zone. They would be able to set up 
their own leasing policies and their own revenue garnering 
methods. However, they would have to donate some revenue to 
the larger international authority. The U.S. viewed the 
International Seabed Authority as a license board what would 
issue permits for various nations or private companies to 
explore and exploit the seabed, but not as a supranational 
institution that did the mining itself. 
Comparing the proposals from the United States and the 
developing nations makes it easy to see what became the 
crucial disagreements in Committee I. Those disagreements 
were over whether the Seabed Authority should be a licensing 
body or a powerful international body that also ran seabed 
mining. Other disagreements centered on mandatory 
technology transfer, an idea American policy-makers found 
abhorrent, voting and representation in the assembly and 
council and payments to the International Seabed Authority. 
Yet, after nine years of negotiations, a draft was devised. It 
reflected a statement made early in the treaty process by the 
American negotiator, Leigh Ratiner, who called for a detailed 
mining regime.17 Ratiner pushed for detail on seabed mining 
because he feared that broad generalizations would be open to 
17. U.N., L.O.S., (Doc. A/CONF. 62/Cl/L6), 13 August 1974. 
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interpretations favoring the developing countries that would 
have majority control of an assembly. The level of detail in the 
mining regime was overwhelming. 
Negotiations moved slower in the Committee I than in 
any of the other two committees at UNCLOS for a number of 
reasons. The ideological split between developing countries and 
developed countries was the firmest in this committee. In the 
other two committees, the North-South split often fell apart 
when countries formed unusual alliances based on other issues 
such as geography .18 The seabed committee was also trying to 
design the world's first economic joint venture that would be 
run by an international organization. And seabed mining did 
not have the emotional immediacy that controlling existing 
pollution in the ocean had or that determining where 
fishermen could throw their nets has had throughout history. It 
was also not a top priority for the United States. 
Another factor that slowed negotiations was declining 
interest in seabed minerals which occurred · as the decade 
progressed and many people concluded they were not the 
treasure at the end of the rainbow. 19 In the course of the 
decade, scientists scaled back their initial estimates of the 
amount of seabed minerals. In addition, the fear of shortages 
of key minerals abated. The world also witnessed a rapid 
transformation of industry from one that was heavily 
18. Bernard H. Oxman, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: 
the 1976 New York Sessions," American Journal of International Law, vol. 71, no. 2 
(1977): p. 251. 
19. Mame Dubs, personal interview with author, Narragansett, RI, 23 July 1991. 
82 
dependent on metals for machinery to one that depended more 
on information and soft computer technology.20 
By the mid-1970s, the developed nations and what is 
called the Group of 77, the name given to developing nations 
that banded together to work as a voting group at international 
negotiations, were deadlocked over a seabed mining regime. 
The United States suggested a compromise in 1976 in an 
attempt to break the deadlock. On April 8, 1976, Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger proposed what became known as the 
"parallel system." He suggested that the seabed regime have 
both American-style private-industry seabed mining and 
mining by the "Enterprise," the mining operation controlled by 
the International Seabed Authority .21 
The compromise was a major concession for the United 
States; it was criticized by the American hard minerals 
industry and frowned upon by some members of Congress. By 
the mid-1970s, Congress had been working for nearly half a 
decade on national seabed mining legislation.22 Suspicious of 
the international negotiations on the common heritage concept, 
the small, but articulate leaders of the American hard minerals 
20. John _Padan, "Commercial Recovery of Deep Seabed Manganese Nodules: Twenty 
Years of Accomplishments," Marine Mining, vol. 9 (1990): p. 87-103. 
21. Ann Rollick, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, p. 316. Schmidt, 
Common Heritage or Common Burden?, p. 124; See also Senate Report No. 96-307, 
Deep Seabed Mineral Resources Act, 96th Cong., 1st sess., p. 86-88. 
22. See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels, Mineral Resources of the 
Deep Seabed, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 17 May 1973; and House, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and on 
International Organizations, The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 96th 
Cong., 1st sess., 11 July 1979. 
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industry had turned to Congress for support. The industry 
which consisted of less than a dozen companies and 
consortiums that had done preliminary research since the early 
t 960s on deep seabed mining, promoted what it called interim 
national legislation.23 Legislative supporters said they wanted 
Congress to adopt this legislation to encourage mining research 
and development to continue until an international treaty was 
completed to supersede the law. 
The main reasons spokesmen for this small industry gave 
for interim legislation was that a treaty would take too long 
and American companies needed legal security to make multi-
million dollar investments in mining research and exploration. 
The U.S. companies stressed that they needed long lead times 
before any actual mining could take place. And they wanted to 
hold onto the technological advantage they had over other 
countries in this new field. 
In addition, the U.S. companies used Congress to express 
their specific desires for what an international regime should 
contain. They were skeptical of the common heritage concept 
and wanted the national law to stress that deep seabed mining 
could be done under the old concept of freedom of the high 
seas. T·he law that passed Congress in 1980, the Deep Seabed 
Hard Mineral Resources Act, states: "It is the legal opinion of 
the United States that exploration for and commercial recovery 
of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed are freedoms of 
the high seas subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the 
23. Juda, Ocean Space Rights, pp. 130-135. 
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interests of other states in their exercise of those other 
freedoms recognized by general principles of international 
law." 24 The legislation had to trumpet freedom of the seas 
because it is the legal doctrine that allows one nation to take 
resources from an unowned area of the sea. 
The law does not endorse the concept of the common 
heritage. Instead, it pays symbolic homage or lip service to the 
phrase and advocates a number of principles that are inimical 
to the concept as was defined by Pardo. The law states that the 
United States support of the 1970 United Nations Declaration of 
Principles was not an acceptance of the common heritage 
concept. Instead, the United States supported the resolution 
with the understanding that the concept would be clearly 
defined in a treaty. The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources 
Act states that the United States is not bound by the 1970 
principles because no treaty had defined the common heritage 
to the satisfaction of the United States.25 
It took the mining industry and the small group of 
Congressional supporters nine years to see a law passed. The 
law that was passed was quite different from the original 
industry proposal which would have guaranteed the federal 
government bail out any private company that lost money 
because of changes in the regime due to an international treaty. 
Presidents Nixon and Ford opposed a national seabed mining 
law primarily because they wanted to give UNCLOS a chance to 
24. U.S. Code, Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Public Law 96-283, 28 
June 1980. 
25. Ibid., Title I, Sec. 2, no. 7. 
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devise an international treaty. However, President Carter 
initially opposed the law, but decided in 1978 to endorse it.2 6 
President Carter and Elliot Richardson, Carter's ambassador-at-
large and special representative for the Law of the Sea, 
endorsed the legislation with the hope that it would put 
pressure on the international treaty negotiations to bring them 
to a close. Carter and Richardson endorsed national legislation 
at a point in the UNCLOS negotiations when the United States 
had achieved its primary goals of addressing navigational and 
environmental concerns. Richardson said in 1992: "I did not 
believe the seabed bill was worth a damn then and I do not 
believe it now. We thought at the time its passage would 
strengthen our bargaining position."27 
However, the developing countries that had formed an 
organization called the Group of 77 strongly objected to 
American legislation and its stipulation that other mining 
nations could join a reciprocating agreement to form a small, 
select treaty agreement outside UNCLOS to · divide up portions 
of the seabed.28 Satya Nandan, a spokesman for the Group of 
77, submitted a statement to Congress strongly opposing the 
bill and claiming it violated The Declaration for a Moratorium 
on Seabed Exploration and Exploitation, the 1969 resolution 
passed by the United Nations General Assembly which placed a 
26. Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden?, p. 87. 
27. Richardson interview, 7 May 1992. 
28. U.S. Code, Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Title I, Sec. 118. 
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moratorium on exploitation of the seabed by any nation until 
an international regime was established.29 
Richardson, a Republican who served as Attorney General 
for Nixon until his celebrated resignation during Watergate, 
played a key role in UNCLOS. He served as the top American 
negotiator from 1977 to 1980. He took the position because of a 
deep commitment to the ocean that dated back to his childhood 
when he would fish off the coast of Marblehead, Massachusetts, 
with his father and send a log of the species of fish he found to 
his uncle, Henry B. Bigelow, the first director of the Woods Hole 
Oceanographic Institution. Richardson made ocean issues a 
priority throughout his career, prosecuting illegal fishing while 
U.S. Attorney in Boston during the 1950s, promoting legislation 
to fund ocean research while an aide to Sen. Leverett 
Saltonstall, R-Massachusetts, and helping to push for a maJor 
Law of the Sea conference in the late 1960s while working for 
the Nixon administration. In fact, Richardson went against the 
advice of fellow Republicans by accepting the position as Law 
of the Sea negotiator in 1977 for a Democratic president. He 
recalled in a 1992 interview that his former Deputy Secretary 
of Defense, William Clemens, who became governor of Texas, 
questioned why he would take the Law of the Sea negotiator 
position. Richardson responded: "I said, 'Bill, you may think 
29. For Nandan's statement see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans and International Environment, Hearing on 
the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess.. 17 August 
1978, p. 243. 
87 
Texas is half the world, but I'm dealing with the problems of 
two thirds of the earth. "3 o 
Richardson came to the negotiations with his own ideas 
about the common heritage concept and how it should be 
codified. He viewed the concept as it had been articulated by 
Lyndon Johnson at the christening of the Oceanographer in 
1966. "I thought it would make no sense to allow a competitive 
struggle to divide up the seabed. It was a global commons to be 
shared. I've never believed the concept meant any more than 
that. To me, nothing in the concept foreshadowed the elaborate 
structure of the International Seabed Authority." For 
Richardson, the practical way to manage the common heritage 
was 1) no individual state would be allowed to acquire title to 
the seabed 2) exploitation should be done in a way that 
contributes to the common interest of mankind 3) there should 
be a fair means of sharing the proceeds from mining among 
nations 4) there should be a fair and efficient way of 
determining who should mine. Checks should be made of 
technical capability, environmental safety and financial 
resources of any prospective miner and 5) there should be a 
body that administers contracts and collects proceeds. Said 
Richard.son: "The idea of superimposing a parastatal 
organization has always been a nutty idea. "3 1 
Richardson blamed the proposed organization of the 
International Seabed Authority which was well in place by the 
30. Richardson interview, 7 May 1992 
31.Ibid. 
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time he joined the negotiations in 1977 on promoters of the 
New International Economic Order. He said at one point that 
linking the NIEO and the common heritage idea emasculated 
the common heritage.3 2 
Despite these opinions, Richardson was primarily 
concerned with creating a treaty and he was willing to make 
concessions to the developing countries in the seabed 
committee to get a viable package deal. By the mid 1970s, the 
major issues in the two other committees had been resolved 
and Richardson focused on the seabed ideological deadlock. 3 3 
While Richardson attempted to negotiate a settlement, 
the mainstream press in America and the U.S. Congress became 
increasingly critical of the common heritage concept. Many 
critics suggested that it smacked of socialism, a dirty word in 
the United States. Robert A. Goldwin, a political advisor and 
former director of Constitutional Studies at the American 
Enterprise Institute, strongly criticized the common heritage 
concept in Commentary, a neo-conservative publication. He 
observed that various nations came to the convention with the 
attitude that the common heritage meant joint ownership and 
that each country was a stockholder. Goldwin argued that this 
concept went against Lockean individualism, the type of 
individualism that he said was deeply ingrained in American 
political and economic tradition. According to Goldwin's view of 
32. Schmidt, Common Heritage of Common Burden?, p. 109. 
33. Bernard H. Oxman, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: 
the 1977 New York Session," American Journal of International Law, vol. 72, no. 1 
(1978). 
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American capitalism, it is best to encourage private enterprise 
to use natural resources with as little regulation as possible. In 
turn, private enterprise will create benefits for the good of the 
entire society. This belief was exactly the opposite of what 
Pardo was saying in his speech, Goldwin concluded. He claimed 
that Pardo warned that strong nations and private companies 
would dominate seabed resources to the detriment of the world 
unless there was some international regime overseeing the 
exploration and exploitation of the deep sea.34 Goldwin also 
condemned the proposed seabed regime that had been 
negotiated at the conference by 1981 as a "complicated, highly 
organized, un-elected, powerful government with abundant 
funding that can not be controlled or cut off." He concluded 
quite simplistically that free enterprise and freedom of the 
seas would better serve society .3 5 
By the end of the 1970s, pundits m the mainstream press 
also criticized the Law of the Sea negotiations on the common 
heritage of mankind. New York Times columnist William Safire 
blasted seabed negotiations calling them "history's greatest 
attempted rip off." He described the draft convention as a "plan 
to place ownership in a new bureaucracy ... dominated by the 
dictator's of the undeveloped world." He charged that three 
presidents had been sailing on the "good ship Guilty 
Conscience" and were making an "unnecessary compromise of 
34. Robert Goldwin, "Locke and the Law of the Sea," Commentary, vol. 71, no. 6 
(June 1981): p. 49. 
35. Ibid., p. 50. 
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our basic free market principles. "36 The Washington Post 
editorial writers accused "Third Worlders" and "Land-based 
producers of minerals" of seeking to restrict competition from 
seabed mining. 37 The growing discontent with the seabed 
negotiations provided a backdrop for President Reagan's 1981 
denouncement of the section of the treaty that established a 
seabed mining regime. 
Richardson stepped down as ambassador in 1980 for 
professional reasons. He said he was aware there was an 
election approaching and he wanted to reestablish his 
Republican credentials. When he stepped down, he said he felt 
confident that the treaty was nearly ready for signing and he 
said he naively believed it would be signed by the United 
States. "Had Carter been re-elected, the treaty would have been 
signed," he maintained.38 
However, Ronald Reagan was elected president and took 
office in January 1981. The Senate also came under Republican 
control. On March 2, the State Department issued a statement 
that it would ask the U.S. representative at UNCLOS to be sure 
the negotiations did not end in the spring session until there 
was a policy review. "The interested Departments and Agencies 
have begun studies of the serious problems raised by the Draft 
Convention ... "39 In April, Reagan's newly appointed 
36. William Safire, "Very Deep Thoughts," New York Times, 4 July 1977, p. 17. 
37. "American Seabed Mining," Washington Post, 19 July 1978, p. A 14. 
3.8. Richardson interview, 7 May 1992. 
39. Bernard H. Oxman, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: 
the Tenth Session," American Journal of International Law, vol. 76 (1982): p. 2. 
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ambassador to UNCLOS, James Malone, told Congress that there 
were provisions in the treaty that were upsetting to industry, 
Congress and the American public and that were in conflict 
with the goals of the Reagan administration.4 O 
The American actions in the eleventh hour upset the 
developing countries and some developed countries. The 
Soviets criticized the Americans for trying to undo a decade of 
work by more than 150 countries and charged it was bad faith 
negotiation.41 The leader of the Group of 77, Inam Ul-Haque of 
Pakistan said: "There have been scores of changes in regimes in 
different countries since the work on the treaty was started 
but no new regime had so far disowned what its predecessors 
had striven to achieve in the field of international cooperation 
for the exploitation of the resources of the seabed which have 
been universally recognized as being the common heritage of 
mankind. "42 
Malone stated his objections to the negotiated seabed 
regime in an August 5, 1981 statement to UN CLOS. Although 
he objected to a number of details of the seabed mining regime, 
the overall objection was that the regime went directly against 
the Reagan philosophy of least government. "Our government ts 
embarked on a course of action designed to reduce inflation 
and stimulate productivity. It is also attempting to reduce 
burdensome regulations that impede industrial activity. Many 
40. Malone testimony quoted by Oxman on page 3 of his review of the Tenth 
Session, see note 39. 
41. Ibid., p. 5 
42. Ibid., p. 6. 
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have viewed the Draft Convention as being inconsistent with 
these basic goals. "43 Malone objected to what he called 
discriminatory advantages given to the "Enterprise," the 
internationally controlled mining operation, that would be 
funded by the international community and would mine a site 
parallel to a site mined by any private company or national 
mining operation. He objected to the transfer of technology 
stipulations in the treaty, the limits on production that were 
established for nickel, to the fact that no seat on the Council 
was guaranteed to the United States and that there was a 20-
year review provision that could alter the entire regime by a 
vote the United States could not controI.44 
Elliot Richardson, although no longer part of UNCLOS 
negotiations, spoke before Congress to object to the content of 
Malone's statements. He said that the treaty provisions for 
membership on the council allow for Western industrialized 
nations to have 6-9 seats. "The United States, either as 
probably the largest investor in deep seabed mining or as the 
largest importer or consumer of deep seabed minerals would 
have as much practical assurance of being named to one of 
these groups ... " Richardson testified before the House Foreign 
Affairs · Committee.45 He also pointed out that the treaty said 
43. Myron H. Nordquist and Choon-ho Park, eds., Reports of the United States 
Delegation to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
Occasional Paper No. 33 (Honolulu: The Law of the Sea Institute, University of 
Hawaii, 1983), p. 528. 
44. Oxman, Tenth Session, p. 9. 
45. For text of Richardson speech see U.S. Congress, House, Foreign Affairs 
Committee, U.S. Policy and the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 97th 
Cong., 1st sess., 14 May, 1981, pp. 27-51. 
93 
that technology transfer would occur with adequate 
compensation. He noted that a number of companies have 
already offered to sell technology to the Enterprise. 
The Reagan administration decided that it would not 
accept Part XI - the seabed portion of the treaty - unless major 
changes were .made. But the other nations, many disgusted 
with the United States for its last minute demands, decided to 
adopt the treaty with or without U.S. support.46 So when the 
signing ceremony was held in 1982, the United States refused 
to sign and remains today the leading developed nation 
boycotting the treaty. It has also urged a number of other 
developed nations to withhold ratification of the treaty because 
of the seabed regime. U.S. Ambassador Thomas Clingan 
announced at the treaty signing ceremony in Montego Bay, 
Jamaica that the U.S. viewed the parts of the convention 
dealing with navigation, overflight, the exclusive economic 
zone, innocent passage and the territorial sea as part of 
"prevailing international practice," however the United States 
could not accept the seabed portions. 4 7 
A total of 117 nations signed the final act and to date 
there have been 51 ratifications. The treaty will go into effect 
one year after the 60th ratification signature is deposited. 4 8 
46. Oxman, Tenth Session, p. 21. The vote on the convention on 30 April 1982 was 
130-4, with 17 abstentions. See The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea in 
I.L.M. vol. XXI, no. 6, November 1982. 
47. Nordquist and Park, Reports of the United States Delegation, p. 665. 
48. The 1982 U.N. Conv. on the L.O.S., Part XVII, Articles 305-308. 
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The countries that have ratified the treaty are predominantly 
the developing countries of the world 
The seabed regime m the final treaty was a mixture of 
elements from proposals by the United States and Third World 
nations. However, as with each of the early proposals, the 
statement about the common heritage of mankind remained 
largely unchanged from the 1970 Declaration of Principles. The 
international seabed area and its resources were to be the 
common heritage of mankind.49 It was defined as the area 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction - that is beyond the 
exclusive economic zone and/or the continental shelf. 
Other components of the common heritage of mankind 
expressed by Pardo in 1967 were present in the treaty. Article 
137 stated that no state could claim sovereignty over the area 
or the resources. The article went further to state that all rights 
to the resources were "vested in mankind as a whole, on whose 
behalf the Authority shall act. "50 Article 140 states that there 
will be preferences. The regime should take "into particular 
consideration the interests and needs of the developing States 
and of peoples who have not attained full independence or 
other self-governing status ... "51 The regime also promoted 
cooperation in marine scientific research and assistance to 
developing countries to strengthen research activities and 
transfer technology .52 The United States and other developed 
49. Ibid., Art. 136. 
50. Ibid., Art. 137, no. 2. 
51. Ibid., Art 140, no. 1. 
52. Ibid., Art. 143. 
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nations influenced the wording of the technology transfer 
sections to ensure that transfers were not required, nor free. 
They were encouraged at fair market rates.5 3 
The seabed section also created the International Seabed 
Authority which would grant contracts for seabed mining. One 
of the major economic compromises between countries that 
promoted free-market economics and those that favored 
planned economies was the creation of the parallel mining 
system. Instead of adopting the idea promoted by the 
developing countries that the International Seabed Authority 
should run the mining operations exclusively, or adopting the 
developed-nation view that there should be a relatively weak 
licensing board to regulate private mining companies, the 
treaty said there would be both. Whenever a private company 
wanted to mine a site, the company would have to propose two 
sites, one to be awarded to the company and the other to be 
reserved for the Enterprise to mine.5 4 
The treaty's Article 150 declared that there would be 
some assistance given to co.untries in which seabed mining had 
a negative effect on a mineral-export national economy. 
Article 151 explains that there will be a ceiling on nickel 
production. Because nickel is one of the four major components 
of manganese nodules, a ceiling on it established automatic 
ceilings on the other minerals which exist in relatively 
consistent proportions in the nodules. The treaty describes 
53. Ibid., Annex III, Art. 5, no. 3, a. 
54. Ibid., Annex III, Art. 8. 
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specifically how this ceiling will be set and it says there will be 
a way of compensating developing countries that are adversely 
affected by the ceiling.5 5 
The treaty established a Preparatory Commission that 
would include all signatories to the convention. There are 
currently 159 nations that have signed. This group works 
together using consensus negotiations to draft provisional deep 
seabed mining regulations.56 Over the last nine years, the 
Preparatory Commission has resolved a number of issues, but 
has yet to resolve the hard-core issues such as how to 
compensate land-based mineral producers, how to include 
observers that are not members of the treaty and whether 
decisions will be made by vote or consensus.5 7 
The commission's most important accomplishment ts that 
it has registered the Soviet Union, Japan, France, India, China 
and a group of former Eastern European nations as "pioneer 
investors. "58 This means that these countries or consortiums 
operating in these countries have received · a portion of the 
international deep seabed for exploration and exploitation. This 
was no simple feat. It required extensive negotiations to 
resolve overlapping claims in the Pacific Ocean area called the 
Clarion~Clipperton Zone. Scientific studies have pointed a 
55. Ibid., Art. 151, no. 4. 
56. Ibid., Annex I. 
57. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Policy News, vol. ix, no. 3 (March 1992): p. 1-2. 
58. Moritaka Hayashi, "Registration of the First Group of Pioneer Investors by the 
Preparatory Commission for the International Sea-Bed Authority and for the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea," Ocean Development and 
International Law, vol. 20, (1989): p. 1-33. 
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substantial volume of manganese nodules with high 
concentrations of nickel and cobalt in this area of the Pacific.5 9 
The Preparatory Commission has also succeeded in 
resolving overlapping seabed claims with mining consortiums 
from three industrialized nations that have refused to sign the 
treaty because of the seabed regime. 60 These consortiums are 
registered for seabed mining in their respective countries 
under national legislation that was passed in the early 1980s 
following the the American Deep Seabed Hard Mineral 
Resources Act. They include consortiums registered in the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Germany. There was a 
point in Preparatory Commission negotiations when the 
spokesmen from both the lesser developed countries and the 
Soviet Union condemned as illegal these outside mining laws 
and registrants. However, in the late 1980s, Preparatory 
Commission members decided that encouraging an 
international regime was more important than fueling a 
standoff between competing regimes so the· commission took 
steps to resolve overlapping claims. The hope is that these 
industrialized countries will eventually join the treaty. The 
Third World countries that dominate the commission also 
recogniZe that the industrialized countries will be significant 
financial contributors, technological and scientific advisors to 
the international seabed regime and the Enterprise operation. 
59. Padan, Commercial Recovery, pp. 98-99. 
60. Hayaski, Registration of the First Group of Pioneer Investors, p. 23. 
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Another trend in the Preparatory Commission has been a 
softening of the ideological line that dominated UNCLOS; there 
have been expressions by Third World leaders that the market 
economy approach is not as abhorrent as it was perceived in 
the 1970s. An example of the softening is the resolution of 
overlapping seabed claims. Preparatory Commission ensured 
that the International Seabed Authority had a prime mining 
site in the center of the Clarion-Clipperton Zone. However it did 
not always require each pioneer investor to present a site of 
equal size to the one it wanted to explore. This was a softening 
of the rigid site-for-site parallel system in the convention.61 
A conciliatory effort is apparent in a statement by 
Ambassador Jose Luis Jesus of Cape Verde, chairman of the 
Preparatory Commission, to the United Nations General 
Assembly on December 10, 1991. He said: 
"the problems that we face today in part XI were born 
out of assumptions made in past negotiations that have 
proved, only 10 years later, to be at .odds with today's 
realities. We should therefore learn the lesson and 
exercise restraint in attempting to find solutions today 
for the seabed mining system on the basis of assumptions 
that might most likely prove to be in contradiction with 
the facts and realities of tomorrow's world. "6 2 
The UN resolution that Jesus put forward said "the 
Assembly would recognize that political and economic changes, 
including particularly a growing reliance on market principles, 
underscored the need to re-evaluate, in light of the issues of 
61. Ibid., p. 15. 
62. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Policy News, vol. ix, no. 1 (January 1992): p. 2. 
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concern to some states, matters in the regime to be applied to 
the Area and its resources and that a productive dialogue on 
such issues involving all interested parties would facilitate the 
prospect of universal participation in the Convention, for the 
benefit of mankind as a whole."63 
Former UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar began an 
effort in 1990 to resolve problems in the seabed regime. These 
informal talks involve Preparatory Commission members and 
industrialized nations. They are continuing under the new 
Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali, who was instrumental in 
urging his country, Egypt, to ratify UNCLOS.64 There is hope 
that a resolution will be made and there is a strong likelihood 
that nine more nations will ratify the treaty in the upcoming 
years, bringing it into force. The United States, however, may 
still be reluctant to ratify the treaty unless some major changes 
are made to the seabed regime, or an election brings a new 
president with a different perspective than that taken in the 
last decade by Presidents Reagan and Bush. 
Although the U.S. rejection of the seabed mining regime 
had a negative effect on the common heritage concept, it was 
the economics of mineral mining that dealt the most serious 
blow to seabed mining in the 1980s. While mineral shortages 
and Third World mineral cartels were feared in the early 
1970s a quite different situation occurred in the 1980s. In 
1984, Marne Dubs, manager of Kennecott Consortium's 
63. Ibid., 2-3 
64. Dolliver Nelson, Executive Secretary of Preparatory Commission, Law of the Sea 
Office for the U.N. Secretariat, telephone interview with author, 20 May 1992. 
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manganese nodule project throughout the 1970s, pronounced 
that "commercial interest in seabed resources is close to its 
nadir." Even the land-based mines that produced these metals 
at much lower costs than would be possible in a seabed 
operation were suffering. The economic forecast has been that 
metal prices will "languish for the rest of the century and well 
into the 21st century.65 
It was also clear by the end of the 1970s that Americans 
were not committed to the same common heritage concept as 
the developing nations. In a speech before the Washington 
Press Club on March 14, 1979, Elliott Richardson said, "We are 
convinced that nations retain their rights to mine the deep 
oceans as one of the freedoms of the seas. "66 What Richardson 
said in 1979 was the opposite of what President Johnson had 
said in the 1966 speech in which he called ocean wealth the 
"legacy of all mankind" and warned against its being taken only 
by the wealthy nations. But President Johnson had never been 
asked to shift from the broad philosophical ·idea of a common 
heritage of mankind to the specifics of establishing an 
internationally controlled business that could satisfy 
diametrically opposed economic philosophies. 
Under the demanding policy-making arena, the common 
heritage concept unravelled. The United States could embrace 
the broad concept of a global commons, but could not accept a 
65. Marne Dubs, "Minerals of the Deep Sea: Myth and Reality," In Giulio 
Pontecorvo, ed., The New Order of The Oceans (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986), p. 89. 
66. Department of State Bulletin, no. 60, 14 March 1979. 
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highly complex government that would oversee three-quarters 
of the earth, regulate and run a mining industry in this area. 
Third World nations also were selective in which components 
of Pardo's concept they embraced. They infused the concept 
with their own desires for price controls, technology transfers 
and fees on private industry engaged in mining. They wanted 
too place the financial burden on mining nations for funding for 
the internationally run mining operation - the Enterprise. 
The concept also suffered during the 1970s as the deep 
ocean faded from a relatively high position on the foreign 
policy agenda. Other domestic and foreign policy concerns 
including the Vietnam War, the oil embargo and the Iranian 
hostage crisis took its place. President Jimmy Carter did not 
view ocean policy as an important form of international 
relations as did Presidents Johnson or Nixon. 67 And President 
Reagan saw no need to make any concessions on seabed mining 
to the Third World. 
The United Nations and Third World ·leaders continued to 
support the seabed regime and have been willing in recent 
years to make compromises with industrialized nations to 
resolve disputes on overlapping seabed mining sites for the 
future. ·To date, these efforts have not convinced the United 
States to sign the treaty or to participate, even as an observer, 
at the Preparatory Commission meetings. These meetings are 
67. Richardson interview, 7 May 1992. See also L. King and F. Jennings, "The 
~xecutive and the Oceans: Three Decades of United States Marine Policy," Marine 
Technology Society Journal , vol. 22, (1988): p. 17-32. 
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the place where the United States could push for changes to 
the seabed regime. The other forum for reconciliation is a 
series of informal meetings launched by the UN Secretary-
General. There have been no major breakthroughs at these 
meetings, but U.S. participation continues. There is some hope a 
resolution will be made here. 
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Conclusion 
In 1983, Arvid Pardo declared " ... the common 
heritage regime established for the international seabed is little 
short of a disaster." 1 But nearly 10 years later, Elizabeth Mann 
Borgese believes the regime is the most advanced form of 
governance ever created by man. From her home in Halifax, 
Nova Scotia, she is still working to get the required 60 nations 
to ratify the treaty.2 To date, 51 nations have ratified or 
acceded to the treaty. They are predominantly small or 
developing nations. The only industrial nation to ratify the 
treaty is Iceland.3 The larger industrial nations that once 
controlled international ocean law, including many of the 
nations capable of mining the deep seabed, have refused to 
ratify the treaty because of the seabed mining regime. 
The concept of the common heritage as defined by Arvid 
Pardo in 1967 was vague and open to a multitude of 
interpretations. That was part of its beauty as a rallying slogan 
for a diverse group of advocates and nations. But it was also its 
downfall as a concrete framework for an economic endeavor 
such as mining. The people who rallied for the common . 
heritage were unsuccessful in turning the philosophy into a 
1. Arvid Pardo, "The Convention on the Law of the Sea: a Preliminary Appraisal," 
San Diego Law Review, vol. 20, no. 2 (April 1983): p. 499. 
2: Elisabeth Mann Borgese, personal interview with author, Halifax, Canada, 1 
November 1991. 
3. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Policy News, vol. ix, no. 1 (January 1992): p. 4. 
104 
viable economic system. The advocates were good at saying 
that the new concept was neither sovereignty nor freedom of 
the seas, neither capitalism nor socialism, but they were unable 
to clearly define what it was. It is an idea much closer to 
socialism because it involves common property. This was one 
of the main reasons it was never embraced fully by policy-
makers and leaders of the United States - a nation that was 
founded on the sanctity of private property. 
The common heritage was an idea born at the right time, 
but one that matured in a more difficult political environment. 
Pardo, President Lyndon Johnson and Borgese began speaking 
about a common heritage in the oceans at a time in the late 
1960s when the world was searching for answers to global 
problems of inequality and poverty. It was also a time when 
people were willing to strongly criticize the capitalistic 
economies of the developed world. But as the idea moved into 
the policy-making arena in the 1970s, it became the job of 
more practically-minded people to create· a common heritage 
regime. 
Many of the delegates to UNCLOS, unlike Pardo and 
Borgese, had national, not necessarily international interests at 
heart. They were realists not idealists. The delegates from 
Third World nations developed and embraced the highly-
nationalistic concept of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone -
an extension of national territory into what had been the high 
seas. They also wanted a deep seabed regime that brought the 
poorer nations as much financial, technological and legal 
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benefits as possible and the least amount of disruption to any 
mineral export income they had. And they liked the idea of 
creating a new form of international law with their stamp on it. 
The delegates from the United States did not have the 
same desire to create a new order of the oceans as their 
counterparts from the Third World. Elliot Richardson, the U.S. 
Ambassador to the Law of the Sea conference from 1977 to 
1980, was much more concerned with getting a treaty in place 
that satisfied a range of American concerns including the desire 
to stop creeping jurisdiction by the world's new nations. He 
viewed the seabed regime with its benefits for the Third World 
as part of the "package deal" established at the beginning of 
UNCLOS. The developed nations would ask for cooperation from 
the Third World on navigation and environmental issues that 
were important to them. In return, the developed nations 
would give the developing countries benefits such as a share of 
seabed wealth, technology transfers, regional oceanographic 
centers and participation m a new international mining 
organization. 
Although Richardson was willing to make this bargain 
and was willing to accept a number of demands from the Third 
World, · President Reagan was ultimately unwilling to make such 
a bargain. It is doubtful that the Republican-controlled U.S. 
Senate with its responsibility for approving international 
treaties would have consented to such a bargain either. In a 
decade, the type of idealism that marked the Johnson 
administration's war on poverty and Food for Peace program 
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had evaporated. The 1970s had been difficult years for 
Americans and the years had taxed the nation's sympathy for 
international solutions that depended in U.S. generosity. The 
Vietnam War, the OPEC oil embargo and the Iranian Hostage 
Crisis helped to rob Americans of international idealism and 
sympathy for the Third World. The 1990s have seen no 
reversal of this trend. There is no economic or political need 
today to court the Third World by making concessions such as 
accepting what is viewed as a socialistic seabed mining 
regime.4 
The problem of designing an economic enterprise that 
satisfies countries that believe in the free market and those 
that feel disadvantaged in the free market and advocate more 
government control, is a task on the agenda of future 
international treaty negotiations. Future negotiations will be 
affected by recent historic developments that call into question 
the state-controlled economy and highlight some advantages of 
the market-approach. The fall of communism and state-
controlled economies in Eastern Europe will contribute to 
changes in the attitude of some of the Third World nations that 
vehemently pushed for a powerful government-controlled 
seabed ·authority. There is already evidence at the Law of the 
Sea Preparatory Commission that Third World leaders are 
softening their stance on demands that the Enterprise be given 
exactly the same size seabed area for mining as any private or 
4. Jane Perlez, "Stranded by Superpowers, Africa Seeks an Identity," New York 
Times (May 17, 1992), p. 1. 
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national mining operation. The New International Economic 
Order is no longer the battle cry. If the conference on the Law 
of the Sea were held today, an entirely different common 
heritage regime for the seabed might be written based on the 
recent criticism of interventionist state economic policies, the 
high cost of mining, the decreased world demand for these 
minerals and the increased environmental concern for the deep 
ocean. 
Americans are recognizing these changes. A number of 
marine policy leaders including Elliot Richardson, Marne Dubs 
and Senator Claiborne Pell have urged the resolution of these 
differences and the ratification of a universal Law of the Sea 
treaty. Elliot Richardson pointed out in 1990 that the 
developing countries were now more willing to make 
compromises with developed countries. He said: "Even among 
the Group of 77 the NIEO no longer has many true believers, 
and the Enterprise has lost much of its mystique." Richardson 
urged the U.S. to stop its boycott of Preparatory Commission 
talks. "It should want to take advantage of any opportunity to 
correct the defects of Part XI. While Part XI is not nearly as bad 
as the Reagan administration made it out to be, it can and 
should · be significantly improved. "5 Richardson believes that 
seabed mining will eventually take place even if it is not the 
great bonanza that was predicted. 
5. Elliot Richardson, "Law of the Sea: A Reassessment of U.S. Interests," 
Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 2 (1990): p. 10. 
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Richardson is not alone in supporting an international 
regime for seabed mining. Even some mining industry officials 
who lobbied in Congress for national seabed mining legislation 
have softened their criticism of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea seabed regime and have 
reconsidered their support of national regulation. Marne Dubs, 
formerly Kennecott Consortium's manganese nodule project 
manager, stated in 1984 that he and other industry spokesmen 
promoted a myth that technology transfer was a pariah to 
American seabed mining companies who wanted to protect 
their competitive commercial advantage. Dubs said the reality 
was that seabed investors have "little or nothing worth 
protecting and even any marginal value is rapidly disappearing 
with the passage of time." He explained that the technology for 
seabed mining was not top secret and much of it was adapted 
from offshore oil drilling technology. 6 
Dubs also said it was a myth that the seabed provisions 
would prohibit private enterprise from investing in mining. He 
said the reality is that rules and regulations could be developed 
by the Preparatory Commission to satisfy private investment. 
Dubs concluded that the first ocean mining that will occur will 
be government subsidized because the expense is too much for 
private enterprise to take on.7 He suggested it was an 
American myth promoted in the 1970s that pure private 
6. Marne Dubs, "Minerals of the Deep Sea: Myth and Reality," In Giulio Pontecorvo, 
ed., The New Order of the Oceans (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 
102. 
7. Ibid., p. 121. 
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enterprise was the best and only way to see the riches of 
seabed exploited for the betterment to mankind. 
Senator Claiborne Pell has continually urged the United 
States to stop boycotting the Preparatory Commission and 
attend as an observer with the goal of resolving differences 
and eventually signing the treaty. "We must take off our 
ideological cloaks," Pell said in a 1991 interview. 8 I also 
believe this is what the United States should do. 
Despite the failure of the seabed regime to translate into 
mining and tangible benefits for the lesser developed countries, 
there were successes in the common heritage movement. The 
primary success was that the idea of a shared resource that 
belongs to mankind as a whole is now a permanent concept in 
international law and marine policy. Its repetition in United 
Nations resolutions, its definition in the Law of the Sea Treaty 
and its association with a clearly defined geographic area - the 
deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction all led to making it a 
part of marine law and geography. 
The common heritage concept also gave a new field -
marine affairs - a central idea to examine and rally behind. It 
excited a small, but fervent group of nongovernmental 
organiz.ations that tried to influence international manne 
policy. Today nongovernmental organizations are thriving and 
raising their voices at other international negotiations, some 
marine-related, others related to broader environmental 
concerns. They are a vital force that will only increase as 
8. Sen. Claiborne Pell, telephone interview with author, 2 December 1991. 
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environmental problems become more real to the general 
public and as the wealth gap between rich and poor nations, 
and between rich and poor peoples within nations, continues to 
threaten international and national stability. 
The common heritage movement is also an example of 
how successful a small group of people can be in promoting an 
idealistic international legal concept. The idea, although initially 
supported by the United States government, was most strongly 
and clearly articulated by Arvid Pardo, an Ambassador from 
Malta. It drew a handful of advocates from the United States 
and a small group of scholarly advocates in Europe. A number 
of governmental leaders and statesmen from the Third World 
were spokesmen for the concept. The common heritage idea 
was one of the main reasons the United Nations convened the 
world's largest Law of the Sea conference. Devising a regime for 
the common heritage area of the deep seabed was the only 
reason negotiations lagged beyond the mid-1970s. This is 
evidence that the idea challenged people. · It is also evidence 
that the idea had something in it to satisfy different political 
philosophies. The lengthy negotiations also reflected the fact 
that the idea was to be used to regulate a large area of earth 
that is ·little understood. The idea tapped into a belief in the 
importance of establishing places on earth that are not owned 
by nations and are protected for the future. Many societies 
have recognized the morality of sharing the earth's natural 
resources in an equitable manner. But the actual practice of 
international resource management remains in its infancy. 
1 1 1 
The success of the common heritage movement in making 
the idea a permanent part of philosophy suggests that a larger, 
more powerful constituency for the oceans might promote 
similar ideas. In recent years, the constituency for the oceans 
has grown, but not as a constituency focused on the deep sea. 
Instead, the growth has been among the numbers of advocates 
for coastal area issues such as pollution cleanup, fish and 
mammal conservation. In the United States, attention shifted 
from the deep seabed and its wealth to the coastal zone in the 
1970s. The problems of pollution, human health and over-
fishing were much more immediate than a mining proposition 
for the deep seabed. Just as the more immediate concept of the 
exclusive economic zone became one of the most significant 
changes negotiated at UNCLOS and broadly accepted by the 
world, the more tangible coastal issues draw a constituency 
that deep ocean issues have yet to attract. The reason is that 
people need to feel connected to what they are discussing and 
promoting. It was always difficult for people to feel connected 
to the remote and dark seabed. It took idealists such as Borgese 
to grasp the abstract idea that a regime for the deep seabed 
was a worthy cause to spend one's life trying to achieve. 
There are two distinct views on whether the principle of 
the common heritage of mankind is. a part of international law. 
A number of developing nations argued that the principle was 
a part of law. The representative from Trinidad and Tobago at 
UNCLOS said "the principle of the common heritage of mankind 
is not new law, it is not constitutive but rather declaratory of 
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existing law. "9 But legal scholars from the west such as 
Christopher Joyner countered that the common heritage of 
mankind principle did not meet the requirements of customary 
or conventional international law because first of all the treaty 
has yet to be ratified by enough countries to bring it into force. 
Moreover, the principle also failed to meet criteria as 
customary law. He said it had not become part of state practice. 
Instead, Joyner concluded the principle was part of philosophy; 
it was "a conceptual ideal not an international legal reality 
supported by state practice." 1 o 
Joyner is right that the common heritage is currently part 
of international legal philosophy. It will become international 
conventional law if nine more countries ratify the treaty. This 
may mean that the industrialized countries that have national 
legislation regulating seabed mining will be violating 
international law. This should be a concern of the United States, 
Germany and the United Kingdom - three of the countries that 
have refused to sign or ratify the treaty and have adopted 
national legislation. The U.S. legislation is called an interim law 
and is supposed to be superseded by an international treaty 
that 1s accepted by the U.S. However, there is a section of the 
law entitled "Transition to International Agreement" which 
9. Milan Bulajic, Principles of International Development Law (Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), p. 311. 
10. Christopher C. Joyner, "Legal Implications of the Concept of The Common 
Heritage of Mankind," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 35 
(1986): p. 73. See also Paul L. Saffo, "The Common Heritage of Mankind: Has the 
General Assembly Created a Law to Govern Seabed Mining?" Tulane Law Review. vol. 
53 (1979): p. 492-520. 
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includes a list of what Congress demands the international 
agreement contain. The most important item on the list is that 
the international treaty is not to "impose significant new 
economic burdens upon such citizens with respect to such 
operations with the effect of preventing the continuation of 
such operations on a viable economic basis." 11 As the treaty 
stands today, it would impose additional fees on an American 
miner that the U.S. law does not require. 
Applying the concept of the common heritage of mankind 
to the deep seabed was a vehicle for Pardo and Borgese. They 
needed a place to give birth to their concept of cooperative 
international relations. The developing countries that promoted 
the concept of the common heritage wanted to make it a piece 
of a New International Economic Order. American diplomats 
went to UNCLOS resolved to curb creeping jurisdiction and 
maintain navigational freedom. They viewed the common 
heritage as a way to halt unilateral claims on increasingly 
larger areas of the ocean. They also viewed it as a bargaining 
chip to use with Third Woild nations. Americans benefited 
from the effect the common heritage concept had on preserving 
the deep seabed from creeping national claims. Yet Americans 
also passed unilateral legislation giving American miners the 
right to make unilateral claims to mme the deep seabed. 
American policy-makers wanted it both ways. This conflict is 
an embarrassment to the United States. However, President 
11. U.S. Code, Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Public Law 96-283, Title 
II, June 28, 1980. 
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George Bush and his predecessor, Ronald Reagan, have refused 
to acknowledge this hypocritical position. Both presidents, prior 
to taking office, had voiced strong opposition to the concept of 
the common heritage. It is unlikely the conflict will be resolved 
in the near future. It may only be resolved when it becomes 
practical or economical for the United States to join the 
international agreement. This may only occur if mining is 
viewed as economically viable or necessary. 
Although the common heritage of mankind concept is not 
yet part of international ocean law, the concept has become 
part of international space law. The common heritage of 
mankind is a central component of the "Agreement Governing 
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies," 
a treaty finalized in 1979. Article X, paragraph I states that: 
"The moon and its natural resources are the common heritage 
of mankind." Echoing Pardo's delineation of the concept of the 
common heritage, the moon treaty states that the moon and its 
natural resources shall not be "subject to · national appropriation 
by any claim of sovereignty .. " The treaty also ensures freedom 
of scientific investigation and that the moon and its resources 
will be used for "the betterment of all peoples, not just for 
those who possess the technological wherewithal to exploit 
them."12 
12. Space Treaty quoted in Joyner, p. 197. See also Peter D. Nesgos, "The Proposed 
IIiternational Sea-Bed Authority as a Model for the Future Outer Space 
International Regime," Annals of Air and Space Law (Toronto: Carswell Company 
Limited, 1980), p. 549. 
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The use of the common heritage concept in ocean and 
space law has contributed to a humanist trend in international 
law, a change in international law that theorists say is 
gradually occurring. This change is a shift from law as a way of 
policing nations and promoting military security to law as a 
way of promoting welfare concerns such as the environment, 
human advancement and anti-poverty.13 This trend is 
expected to continue as more small, developing nations push 
for greater recognition and greater influence on international 
law and economics. UNCLOS was the first treaty negotiation 
that brought together as large a number of the world's 
countries to discuss international law. Another trend that has 
been seen since UNCLOS is a gradual shift in world leadership 
from traditional powers such as the United States and Europe 
to other nations such as Japan. 
The recent conference that brought together an even 
larger number of countries than UNCLOS was the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
J aniero. One of the major issues at this conference was 
determining how to slow global deforestation. The issue pit the 
industrialized nations who advocate rain forest preservation 
against a number of poverty-stricken developing nations that 
look to their rain fores ts as economic mainstays and view their 
decisions about these forests as a sovereign right. The idea that 
nature in general and rain fores ts in particular are part of the 
tJ. Edward McWhinney, D. Ross, G. Tunkin, eds., From Coexistence to Cooperation: 
International Law and Organization in the Post-Cold War Era (Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1991). 
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common heritage of humankind underlies the argument of a 
number of nations that want to participate in decisions about 
these valuable resources. The phrase common heritage has 
been used in newspaper articles and applied to rain fores ts to 
describe one of the central issues of the conference.1 4 
The global visionaries - represented most vocally by the 
nongovernmental environmental organizations - are once again 
urging that nature be considered the common heritage of 
humankind and be protected for this and future generations by 
a cooperative international treaty. Although resources such as 
rain forests may never be declared the common heritage in 
international law, the fact that people view them as such may 
increase the chance they will receive some global protection. 
The environment - atmosphere, oceans and forests - is the new 
global issue that demands cooperation as seabed mining 
demanded it in the 1970s. These resources are much less 
obscure than minerals on the floor of the ocean and there is a 
greater chance that international policy will be devised for 
environmental protection. The Third World has a much better 
bargaining position to get demands of aid and technology 
transfer in environmental diplomacy than it did with seabed 
mining.' In the 1970s, the Third World played on the guilt of 
developed nations when it tried to promote cooperation, 
technology transfers and developed nation-funding of seabed 
mining. The Third World needed to be given the technology to 
14. Marlise Simons, "North-South Divide Marring Environment Talks," New York 
Times (March 17, 1992): p. AS. 
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participate in such an economic enterprise. Today, the Third 
World can demonstrate that the developed countries are 
responsible for much of the environmental degradation to the 
atmosphere. The Third World can use this scientific arguments 
to demand technology that will help its nations curb 
environmental problems that might accompany development. 
The Third World also controls much of the world's rain forests. 
This gives these nations leverage in negotiations about 
preserving these forests. 1 5 
As far as the oceans are concerned, the concept of the 
common heritage rules the seabed by default. Developed 
countries do not have the interest to engage in seabed mmmg. 
When and if there is economic demand for the seabed minerals, 
the common heritage concept will probably continue to dictate 
the way both developed and developing nations engage in the 
activity. At this point, the developed nations may see a need to 
resolve the more technical disagreements in the treaty and 
may then join it. Until then, the idea of including the nations of 
the world in the management of a global commons remains a 
goal that internationalists will continue to preach in marine 
policy as well as global environmental policy. 
There is a need for this type of idealism even if it never 
translates into concrete policy. It has an effect on policy and 
contributes to larger trends in international relations. The idea 
of the common heritage is unlikely to galvanize people from 
15. Paul Lewis, "Negotiations in Rio Agree to Increase Aid to Third World," New 
York Times (14 June 1992): p. 1, sect. 1. 
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different nations in the way it did briefly at the end of the 
1960s, however, there is a chance that leadership from people 
who do not fall into ideological camps could succeed in 
international ocean affairs. 
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Elisabeth Mann Borgese, founder of the International Ocean 
Institute and former delegate from Austria to the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Halifax, Canada, 1 
November 1991. Correspondence, 12 February 1992. 
Marne Dubs, manager of Kennecott Consortium's manganese 
nodule, former advisor to the U.S. delegation to UNCLOS. 
Narragansett, RI, 23 July 1991. 
Miriam Levering, Ocean Education Project, correspondence, 4 
October 1991. 
Dolliver Nelson, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory 
Commission, Law of the Sea Office for the U.N. Secretariat. 
Telephone interview, 20 May 1992. 
Arvid Pardo, former Ambassador to the United Nations from 
Malta. Telephone interview, 2 December 1991 and 
correspondence, 11 February 1992. 
Senator Claiborne Pell, Rhode Island's U.S. Senator. Telephone 
interview, 2 December 1991. 
Elliot Richardson, former Ambassador-at-Large, Special 
Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea and 
currently a senior partner at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. 
Telephone interview, 7 May 1992 
Barbara Weaver, United Methodist Church, Women's Division 
Board of Global Ministries, formerly a member of the Neptune 
Group and the Methodist Church Law of the Sea Project. New 
York City, 20 September 1991. 
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